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INTRODUCTION
The least one can say when dealing with a comparison

between common law and civil law systems is that their
approach to legal problems is drastically different. This
is particularly true with regard to countries like France

and the United States. Whereas the French legal system is

primarily based upon statutes and codes, the American one
relies heavily on case law. Moreover, there is not only
one american set of rules but rather fifty different ones,

which renders particularly difficult and uncertain any
comparative study between French and American legal rules.
Indeed, the former are uniform throughout the country

whereas the latter are characterized by their diversity.
Nevertheless, it has happened in the most recent American

legislative history that, in certain areas, nationwide
legislative attempts of unification and standardization

blossomed into reality. That is noticeably the case with
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code 1 which governs
the sale of goods law.

x

The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in all
the states but Louisiana.

In most market economy countries, warranty policies

have become major considerations in the overcompetitive

conquest of consumers. In this context, the need has been
felt in France as well as in the United States over the
last few decades to protect

consumers against dangers

inherent to the inequality of bargaining power with

merchant and manufacturers and consequently to assure
consumers adequate remedies in case of defective product.
Likewise, in commercial transactions, assurance of the

product's quality is of the utmost importance: imperfect
goods may generate economic disasters which may be hardly

commensurable. Legally speaking, if the seller's warranty

obligations are statutorily

regulated under the American

and French law, there are still some issues which are

unsettled or evolving through judicial precedents. In that
respect, the possibility for the seller to limit his

warranty liability and the actual bearing of the warranty
all along the chain of distribution of a product are indeed

striking illustrations.
That is why undertaking a comparison between american
and french rules as regards the warranty of quality in sale
of goods is most tempting

.

Tangible bases such as the

American Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and the French
Civil Code (Civ.C.) will be our major tools to assess

similarities and differences. We will also refer to
specific consumer protection oriented statutes. In order to

1

get into deepest details

,

it is necessary to narrow such a

comparative study. Thus the warranty of title will not be
dealt with. Nor we will focus on the warranty of quality in
real property transactions which would deserve because of

their specificity an entire paper. An endeavour to cover as

completely as possible the relevant issues raised by the

warranty of quality in sale of goods requires us to go
through four areas of interest.
The first part of the paper will be devoted to

defining which kinds of defect may give birth to an action
for breach of warranty of quality (I).

Once given an overview of what may constitute a

warranty of quality, it will be necessary to point out
which conditions have to be carried out to achieve a

warranty action (II).
Assuming such conditions are met, what would then be
the remedies available to an aggrieved buyer (III)?

Finally, we will have to contemplate to whom does the

seller's warranty of quality extend (IV)?

CHAPTER

I

.

THE CONCEPT OF WARRANTY OF QUALITY

In the process of widening the seller's

responsibility for quality and the buyer's protection
against defective goods, both American and French law use

warranties implied by law

(A)

and warranties created by the

parties to the contract themselves (B).
A)

LEGAL WARRANTIES

:

While the French tradition has ever been to secure
the buyer a legal warranty,

2

the American tendency, deeply

marked by the principle of caveat emptor,

3

has been rather

slow to admit and enforce implied by law warranties.

4

However, the most recent historic evolution of the American

warranty law 5 has led to a complete incorporation of
2

The original version of the French Civil Code (1804)
already contained articles 1641 and following dealing with
warranty against defects in the thing sold.
3

The principle of caveat emptor was illustrated by
"He who does not open his eyes, opens his
the maxim
purse
:

.

4

Still in the middle of the last century, the rule
was firmly established that in the absence of an express
warranty or fraudulent misrepresentation, the seller are
not responsible for defects. See Chief Justice Gibson
opinion in McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 57, 34 Am. Dec
497,

499
s

(Pa. 1839).

The original Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated
in 1952.

5

implied warranties 6 as legal tools at the unsatisfied

buyer's disposal. The purpose of the following discussion
will be to address the U.C.C. implied warranties

(a)

and its french counterpart: the legal hidden defect

warranty
a)

(b)

Implied Warranties under the U.C.C.
The drafters of the U.C.C. distinguished the implied

warranty of merchantability

(1)

from the implied warranty

for fitness of a particular purpose (2).
1)

The implied warranty of mechantability (S. 2-314)"7
e

U.C.C. S.2.314 and S.2.315.
''U.C.C.,

S.

2.314 provides

:

"(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in
a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with
respect to the goods of that kind. Under this section the
serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on
the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under
the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair
average guality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by
guality and guantity within
the agreement, of even kind
each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adeguately contained, packaged, and
labeled as the agreement may reguire; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of
fact made on the container or label if any ".
,

(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other
implied warranties may arise from couse of dealing or usage

of trade.

6

If one looks for the underlying basis of the implied

warranty of merchantability, one will stress the general
assumption that the seller induces the buyer's reliance by
his superior knowledge in the market place as to goods
sold.

If one has to define what is expected from

"merchantable" goods, one will be likely to say that they
should be fit for their ordinary purpose. That is why the

notion of implied warranty of merchantability will be
studied under two angles: as to the seller (11), as to the
good sold
11

)

(

12)

As to the seller

According to

S.

2-314(1), the implied warranty of

merchantability attaches only if the seller is a
with respect to the goods of that kind."

provision

of the U.C.C.

"

merchant

As every

is to be read in the light of each

other, it seems logical to refer to the definition of

merchant provided by

S.

2-104(1)

s

Two alternative criteria

may be drawn from that definition: the seller is the one
who either deals with some goods (111) or has some
knowledges with respect to the goods sold (112).

8

"Merchant" means a person who
S. 2-104(1) provides:
deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill particuliar
to the practice or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.

Ill) The seller "deals in goods of that kind"

It is no doubt that someone who is used to selling

goods must have some special knowledge or skills related
to these particular goods and therefore has to face

potential problems that might arise from defective
products. It is more disputable to hold a merchant liable
for a product's defectiveness when the selling of that

product happens to be rare and constitute a small part of
his business. Nevertheless, courts

have adopted a fairly

broad construction of the merchant notion and declared
sellers liable, whether or not they regularly sold a

particular product. 9 Likewise, a seller may be deemed

merchant for purposes of

S.

a

2-314(1) at any market level:

manufacturers- 10 wholesaler and retailers. 11 As broad as
the merchant concept may be contemplated it does not

embrace a doctor who incidentally supplies goods and whose

3

See, e.g Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co.,
402 F. Supp. 1017, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 636 (D.Conn. 1975).
,

1Q See , e.g , Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber
Cheese Co., 326 F. Supp. 504, 509, 9 U.C.C Rep. 407, 414
(W.D. Mo. 1971) (cheese manufacturer); Hester v. Purex
Corp., 534 P. 2d 1306,1307 16 U.C.C. Rep. 697 699 (Okla.
1975) (cleaning product manufacturer).
.

,

lx See

Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d 1033, 1035,
e.g
23 U.C.C. Rep. 1143, 1145 (5th Circ. 1978) (horse dealer);
R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442
F.Supp. 838, 846, 23 U.C.C. Rep. 310, 319 (N.D. Miss.
1977)

,

.

,

(antifreezer seller).

8

activity primarily consists on rendering services rather
than selling goods. 12
112) The seller has expertise with respect to the goods

sold
It has here to be observed that there is a latent

conflict between, on the one hand, the merchant definition
set forth in S. 2-104(1), and on the other hand, the

Official Comment

3

to S.

2-314. Indeed, the latter

suggests that "a person making an isolated sale of goods
is not a merchant within the meaning of the full scope of

this section and, thus, no warranty of merchantability

would apply."

Yet, an occasional seller might very well

possess such knowledge or skill mentioned in the U.C.C.

definition of a merchant. Up to now, Official Comment

3

has

prevailed and courts have been reluctant to hold that a
non-professional seller is a "merchant" for purposes of
S.

2-314 (1). X3 Thus, the isolated-sale exception has been

used as an efficient means to avoid strict liability
warranty. However, it would seem rational to use the

following test: has the seller special expertise as to the
X2 See, e.g
Berry v. G.D.
14 U.C.C. Rep. 346 (111.).
.

550,

13 See,

,

Searle

&

Co.,

309 N.E.2d

e^., Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill.App. 3d 961, 964,
341 NE.2d 713, 715, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 884, 887 (1975) (a
sawmill owner in the sale of a saw to another sawmill)
Rock Creek Ginger Ale Co. v. Thermice Corp., 352 F.Supp.
522,528, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 810, 817 (D.D.C. 1971) (a beer
producer in the sale of carbon dioxide it has in excess of
its beer production)

3

goods sold?

That would enable courts, in certain circum-

stances, to hold that a mere user is a "merchant" as well
as to discharge from his warranty liability a seller which
is incidentally a supplier of a particular product.
12)

As to the good sold

Even though

S.

2-314 (2) gives an impressive list of

criteria of merchantability, we will only focus, as a

workable tool for this study, on the third one: "Goods to
be merchantable must be fit for the ordinary purpose for

which such goods are used."
Indeed, in the context of a comparative study with

the french law, the five other standards of merchantability

have to do with other seller's obligations, namely giving

information and delivering the good to the buyer. These
obligations, though closely connected with the obligation
of warranty are subjected under the french law to specific

rules 14 and therefore are beyond the scope of our

discussion. That is why the concept of merchantability will

here be restricted to the notion of fitness
for an ordinary purpose (121). Whether used goods have to

be fit for their ordinary purpose will also be debated
(122)

.

14 The obligation of delivery is ruled by articles 1604
to 1624 of the Civil Code.
The obligation to give information is generally
speaking a case law obligation and has been embodied by
specific laws (Act of 10/01/1978 on the consumer

protection)

10

121) The notion of fitness for an ordinary purpose

It may be asserted that the goods which are unfit for

their ordinary purpose are "substandard". That is to say
that such goods are not reasonably safe or able to perform

their ordinary purpose. In both cases, these goods must

contain an inherent defect. 15

In order to ascertain a

defect, goods have to be compared with other goods of the
same kind. A product may be imperfect without being

defective. Despite its imperfection, is it fit for its

ordinary purpose

?

"ordinary" purpose

That leads us to consider what is an
.

It may be opposed to an

"extra-

ordinary" purpose when goods are used under abnormal

conditions 15 and to a "specific" purpose intended by the
buyer 1

"

7

and not necessarily communicated to the seller.

15 Three general types of defects are to be considered:

manufacturing defects, design defects and failure to give
the buyer proper instructions with respect to the goods.
16 See, e.g ., in Hobson Constr. Co. v. Hajoca Corp., 28
N.C.App. 684, 222 S.E.2d. 709, 19 U.C.C.Rep. 106 (1976),
plaintiff purchased equipment for a water filt plant.
Apparently as a result of excessive water pressure, the
equipment failed to filter the water sufficiently to meet

governmental regulations. The court concluded that "the
merely establishes that the distributor heads
evidence
were not fit for use under excessive water pressure as
contained by the Water Corp.'s system, which was not the
ordinary purpose for which the goods were sold."
1

"

For a general discussion of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, see infra Ch.I) A) a) 2).
7

11

122) Used goods and warranty of merchantability

The warranty of merchantability that may attach used
goods is neither directly addressed by

S.

2-314 nor by any

other U.C.C. provisions. Hence, one could conclude that
there is no legal obligation of warranty merchantability.

This would be going too far since we may draw from official

Official Comment

3

S^-SIA 18 that under certain circum-

stances merchantability of second-hand goods may be

required from the seller. Facts like the extent of goods
prior use, the buyer's knowledge that the goods are used
and a discount price are taken into account to determine

what may be expected from the goods in terms of

merchantability.

Furthermore, whenever used goods are

sold by a non-merchant, the implied warranty of

merchantability is more than unlikely to attach.
Ultimately, it frequently occurs that used
"as is" which under S. 2-316

(

3

)

(

a)

goods are sold

is squarely equivalent to

a disclaimer. 19

^Official Comment 3 S. 2-314 provides in part: "A
specific designation of goods by the buyer does not exclude
the seller's obligation that they be fit for the general
purposes appropriate to such goods. A contract for the sale
of second-hand goods, however, involves such obligation as
is appropriate to such goods for that is their contract
description.
X9 For a general discussion on warranty disclaimers,
See Ch.II) B) supra.

12
2)

Implied warranty for a particular purpose (S.2-315) 20
Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability which

is to a large extent an objective warranty that applies to

inherently defective products, the implied warranty for
fitness of a particular purpose is rather a subjective
warranty. 21 Indeed the goods might function properly, have
no inherent defect and at the same time may not be fit for
the buyer's particular purpose.

Conditions needed for its

application are subject to difficulties of appraisal (21)
and to evidentiary problems. 22
(

21)

As to the seller

The implied warranty of S.2-315 will arise only if
the seller should know the buyer's special purpose for

which the goods are required. It does not necessarily mean
that the seller actually knows the particular purpose. The

buyer who has to prove his special intended use of the
goods will likely be successful in his task whenever he is
able to shower either of the following elements: actual

2

2-315 provides:
"Where the seller at the time of
contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying
on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless exclude or modified under
the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose."
°S.

2:L

The implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose is often presented as a contextual or environmental warranty.

13

communication by the buyer of his particular purpose, 22
goods particularly manufactured and assembled for buyer's
business, 23 past dealings between parties. 24 In sum, any
time the buyer is able to prove, under the circumstances

surrounding the sale, that the seller has "reason to know"
his particular purpose he will meet the first requirement
of S. 2-315.

22) As to the buyer

The burden of proof which hangs over the buyer is

fairly heavy since, in addition to the seller's knowledge
of his special purpose, the buyer has also to prove his own

reliance upon the skill or judgment of the seller to select
an article suitable for his needs. The relevant issue is

thus to define which kind of evidence is most useful in

showing the buyer's reliance.
A provision empowering the seller to select the

proper product according to the buyer's needs is an "ideal"
situation. Otherwise, reliance will be inferred from

circumstances surrounding the sale. As

a

matter of general

rule, comparison between respective expertise of the buyer
22 See,

Ct.1967),

4

Catania v. Brown 231 A2d 668 (Conn.Cir.
e.g
U.C.C. Rep. 443.
.

,

23 See,

e.g ., Jones, Inc. v. W.A. Wiedebush Plumbing
Heating Co., 201 S.E.2d 248 (W.Va. 1973), 13 U.C.C. Rep.
818.
24 See,

Utah Cop. Ass'n v. Egbert-Haderlie Hog
e.g
19 U.C.C.
Farms, Inc., 550 P. 2d 196 (Utah 1976)
Rep. 1095.
.

,

,

&

14

and the seller as to the goods subject to the sale is used

by courts as a persuasive means to assess the buyer's

reliance on the seller. 25 Likewise, it is well settled
that if the buyer participated in the goods selecting

process, he should be estopped from claiming his reliance
on the seller. 26

These developments concerning implied warranties
under the U.C.C. provisions would be incomplete if it were
not mentioned that there expressly exists an implied

warranty created by course of dealing or usage of trade.

2

"

7

To a certain extent, this implied warranty overlaps with
S.

2-314 2) (a) 2S and seems to be used by courts to state an
(

implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a

particular purpose when they refer to the surrounding
circumstances of the sale.

25 See,

Carson v. Chevron Chemical Co. 635 P2d
e.g
1248 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981), 32 U.C.C. Rep. 834.
26 See,

e.g

220 Cal.Rptr.
2_7

S.

2S S.

.

,

.

,

392

Keith v. Buchanan, 173 Cal.App.3d 13,
(1985).

2-314(3), See note 7/ supra.

"Goods to be merchantable
2-314(2) (a) provides:
objection in the
without
pass
as
such
least
at
be
must
description."
contract
under
trade

15
b) The Civil Code Hidden Defect Warranty

(Art.1641) 29

On the one hand, as far as the thing sold is

concerned, the Art. 1641 sets up very precise conditions to
be complied with to trigger the legal warranty (1). On the

other hand, in contrast with

S.

2-314 (1),

3°

there is no

special requirement as to the seller (2).
I

As to the goods sold
Civ. C. Art. 1641 describes hidden or material defects

as imperfections gathering two features. Imperfections must

prevent the buyer from using the goods as he intended (11)
and must not be discoverable by the buyer at the time of
the purchase (12).
II

The goods must be defective

Two issues have to be contemplated:

what is legally

speaking a defect? (Ill) and how should the "pre-existing
defect" rule be understood? (112)
III) The legal concept of defect

Whichever imperfection the goods may reveal, they
will not necessarily be deemed defective pursuant to
29 C.Civ.

"The seller must
Article 1641 provides:
warrant against hidden defects in the thing sold which make
for which it is intended, or so
ti unfit fir the use
buyer would not have acquired it,
the
that
use
impair this
lower price, if he had known of
a
paid
have
or would only
them."

2-314 (a) sets forth as a matter of principle that
the seller has to be a merchant.
3

°S.

16

Civ. C. Art.

That is to say that only serious

1641.

imperfections are taken into account whereas mere

inconvenience in the use are not.

33-

Serious imperfections

might be defined as sufficiently grave to significantly

prevent the use of the goods intended by the parties or to

substantially lessen the goods' worth. 32
112) The defect must exist prior to the sale

It is the buyer's duty to prove that the defect

existed at the time of the sale. This condition is not

expressly mentionned by Civ. C. Art. 1641 but is

a

well-

settled case law rule. 33 It means that the defect is
inherent to the goods sold and results neither from misuse
of the buyer (1121), nor from natural wear and tear (1122).

3x See, e.g

Nimes, 12/18/1983, D.1983. 29. (there is
no material defect for a car whose floor vibrates.)
.

,

32 See,

e^., Civ. 01/30/1967, J. C. P. 1967. II. 15025
(an impotent bull); Comm. 07/01/1969, Bull. Civ. IV, # 255
(rotten cheese); Comm. 05/11/1965, Bull. Civ. Ill, # 306
Civ. 11/22/1978, D. 1979, I.R. 147
(an unseaworthy boat)
(an unworkable alarm-system); Comm. 05/15/1972, Bull. Civ.,
# 144 (an household appliance which kept breaking down);
Civ. 11/28/1979, D.1980, I.R. 566 (a T.V. set which
47, 9 a
imploded); Comm. 06/13/1977, Bull. Civ. IV,
powerless motor for the intended use).
;

tt

33 See,

e.g .. Civ., 02/09/1965, Bull. Civ. Ill, \ 103;
Comm. 12/10/1973, D.1975. 122.; Civ., 01/12/1977, Bull.
Civ. I, # 28; Comm. 18/01/1984, Bull. Civ. IV, # 26.
(Mandatory rule to show that the defect existed before the
sale or delivery of the good, or was already in germ.)

17

1121) Misuse of the buyer

For obvious reasons french case law has always

admitted that the manufacturer or seller could not be held
liable for abnormal or unforeseeable use of the goods by
the buyer. 34 Indeed, the goods are not inherently

defective: the defect is the result of buyer's misuse. In
case of a special purpose intended by the buyer, it has to
be known by
buyer. 35

the seller and not only wanted by the

Buyer special purpose might be presumed from his

past dealings with the seller. 36
1122) Natural wear and tear

However high a product quality may be, there is
normal expectations, in terms of length, beyond which the

product is not any more able to be fit for its use. That is

why for each particular product courts will estimate

whether the defect is the result of a normal wear and
"

tear.

3 7

It has to be underlined that not as much should be

3 *

See e.g
Comm. 03/17/1964, Bull. Civ. III,# 156
supposed to be used as a motor
private
not
(a
car is
racing car); Civ. 01/24/1978, J.C.P. 1968. II. 15429.
(fresh cheese is not supposed to be preserved for months);
Comm. 01/19/1978, Bull. Civ. IV, # 17. (no warranty attaches
when the product is not used pursuant to the manufacturer's
instructions)
.

,

.

,

Civ.

3S See, e.g.

,

Comm. 03/14/1972, Bull. Civ. IV,

,

35 See

,

e.g

01/24/1968, D. 1968. Somm. 122.
#

88.

"See, e^., Civ. 05/29/1963 Gaz. Pal. 1963.2.363.
(electric wires expected to wear out after few years.)
,

18

expected from used goods as from new goods. Discount price
in this context is an element of appraisal. 38

.

12) The defect must be hidden

Art.

1642 provides:

"The seller is not responsible

for obvious defects which the buyer could have ascertained

for himself."

Indeed, it seems logical that a buyer be not

entitled to complain about what he was aware of or should
have discovered. 39 Thus the defect must be hidden at the
time of the sale. In other words, it must be neither

conspicuous (121) nor revealed to the buyer. (122)
121)

Conspicuous or visible defect
A defect is not hidden

,

even if it might be actually

ignored by the buyer, whenever the latter could have

readily discovered it. The buyer is expected to carry out
basic ascertainings.

4°

Buyer's technical knowledges as to

the goods will determine the extent of his checking. A

deeper care is required from a professional:

3S See, e.g.

,

a defect

Rouen, 02/14/1979, D. 1980, I.R. 223.

39 Plenty of Civil Code rules are under lied by the
" Law's purpose is to help the one who is
following maxim
awake and to disregard the one who is asleep."
:

4

°See, as an illustration of visible defects, Comm.
02/05/1974, Bull. Civ. IV, # 50 (stains on a coat which
was on display for a long time); Comm. 01/24/1984, Bull.
Civ. IV, # 34 (a new vehicle with many blight parts).

19

might be hidden for a consumer and visible for a

professional 41
122) Revealed hidden defect

It may happen that the defect is not conspicuous nor

deemed hidden because the buyer knew it before entering
into the contract. 42

The buyer has to act in good faith:

he is not allowed to complain about what he knowingly

agreed upon.

In other words if the seller revealed some

product's imperfection the buyer lost his cause of action
under Art. 1641
2

)

&

following.

As to the seller

Unlike the warranty of merchantability which is

roughly its American counterpart, french legal warranty
does not require as a condition the seller to be a

merchant. Generally speaking, as far as the legal warranty
scope of application is concerned, 43 it makes no

difference whether the seller is a mere occasional seller
or professional dealer.

41 See,

e.g
Comm. 10/05/1965, D.1965. 831. (a truck
bought by a truck driver); Paris 12/11/1975 J.C.P. 1977.
II. 18531. (a second-hand car bought by a garage owner);
stained fruits
Comm. 02/15/1982, Bull. Civ. IV, #59
purchased by a professional)
.

,

(

42 See,

e^g., Comm. 02/05/1974, D.1974, I.R. 116.

43 We will see

(in Ch.III) that as regards the extent
of remedies there is a good deal of difference between

non-merchant and merchant seller.
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B)

EXPRESS WARRANTIES
Under both American and French legal systems, two

key-

ideas govern the rules applicable to express warranties.

One the one hand, as a matter of principle, parties to a

contract are free to set up their agreement according to
their desires and needs. One the other hand, some statutes

have been enacted in order to protect consumers against the

supererior bargaining power of the seller. 44

As to the

integration of the foregoing considerations within the

policy governing express warranties, we will see a good
deal of difference between the American and French sets of
rules (a). Likewise, as to links and interactions between
legal and contractual warranties under both systems (b),

dissimilarities will be pointed out.
a)

Express Warranties' Policy

Whereas the notion and regime of express warranty
have been widely developed by the U.C.C.

(1),

these issues

have not been specifically addressed by the french

legislature

(

2)

'The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Act of January 4,
1975) has established federal standards for consumer
Statute # 78-23 on consumers
product warranties.
information and protection (Statute of January 10, 1978).
4

4i
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I

The sophisticated concept and regime of express

warranties under U.C.C
A quick look at U.C.C.

.

(S.
S.

2-313) 45

2-313 indicates that the

concept of express warranty is broadly conceived (11) and
the regime of express warranty is closely tied to an

element --the basis of the bargain -- whose construction by
courts is still uncertain (12).
II) The concept of express warranty

It may be presented through a general principle (121)

which is subjected to some limits (122).
III) General Principle

Roughly speaking, any or almost any representations
of the goods may create an express warranty. Whatever the

way of presenting the quality of his products may be, the
45 U.C.C. Section 2-313 provides:

Express warranties by the seller are created as
follows
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by
the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and
becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made
part of the basis if the bargain creates an express
warranty that the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is part of the
basis of the barbain creates an express warranty that the
whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an expres
warranty that the seller use formal words such as
"warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of
the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods
does not create a warranty.
(1)

22

seller may be held liable: written or oral statements, 4S

blueprints as well as brochures 4 7 samples like models 48
"

may amount to an express warranty. It has here to be noted
that the Magnuson-Moss warranty Act, 49 which deals with

written consumer product warranties, does not regulate the
substance of warranty terms nor reguired any business to
offer a warranty to consumers.

However wide the concept of

warranty may be, it is nevertheless subjected to certain
limits (122).
112) Limits

Two limits have to be spelled out: generic

description (1221) and "puffing" (1222).
1121) Generic description
A too general or generic term does not amount to

express warranty by description. Describing the general
nature and function of a product does not characterize its
46 See,

e.g
KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elelecs. Corp.,
327 F.Supp. 315, 324, 9 U.C.C.Rep. 649, 661 (W.D. Ark.
1971) (oral statement that commercial television eguipment
.

,

would produce top-guality picture)
4_7

See, e.g , Interco, Inc. v. Randustrial Corp.,
533 SW2d 257 (Mo.Ct.App. 1976), 19 U.C.C.Rep. 464 (language
in the seller's catalog that stated that a floor-covering
.

product would absorb considerable flex without cracking)
48 See,

Zappala & Co. v. Pyramid Co., 439 NYS2d
e.g
765 (NY App.Div. 1981), 31 U.C.C.Rep. 550 (seller's
delivery of discolored concrete blocks differing from
sample)
.

,

49 See note 44/ supra.
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quality. No court has yet accepted the generic description
theory. Indeed, if it were the case, as it is hardly

conceivable to contemplate a sale with no identification of
the product sold, U.C.C. S.2-316(2)

5°

would be unworkable.

Put it another way, assuming a generic description deemed
an express warranty of merchantability, it would be

inconsistent to give afterwards effect to a disclaimer of
the implied warranty of merchantability.
1122) Puffing
A certain level of specificity and objectivity is to

be required of seller's representations of the goods to

distinguish an express warranty from mere puffing or
seller's talk. 5X

Drawing the line between waranty and

seller's talk, namely between statement of fact and
opinion, may be not obvious. Mathematical precision 52 is
to be opposed to imprecise affirmations. 53

Certain

factors are constantly taken into account to determine

whether seller's affirmations are enforceable sales talk
5

°S. 2-316(2) allows, under certain conditions, to
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability, (for a
general discussion on disclaimers, See Ch.II).

51 This statement is supported by U.C.C.
See note 45/ supra.

52 See,

.

53 See,

.

S.

2-313 (2),

439
Woodbury Chem. Co. v. Holgerson,
e.g
F.2d 1052, 1054, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 999,1001 (10th cir. 1971)
(weed-killer 80% effective).

Rep.

629

,

e.g , Bickett v. W.R. Grace Co., 12 U.C.C.
(W.D.Ky. 1972).

:

24

seller's attempt to hedge his representations 54 and

buyer's knowledge or expertise as to the goods
purchased. 55
12) The regime of express warranty

A mere reading of S. 2-313 points out that the basis

of the bargain is the keystone to ascertain whether

seller's representations may trigger seller's express

warranty obligations. It is thus necessary to present what
the basis of the bargain test consists in (121). Certain

related issues will thereafter be discussed (122).
121

)

Presentation of the basis of the bargain test
However seller's representations may be made, they

will only trigger seller's express waranty obligations if
they can be deemed "part of the basis of the bargain."

The

basis of the bargain requirement roughly equates with

showing the buyer's reliance on the seller's representations. There is a presumption that seller's affirmations go

to the basis of the bargain and are consequently express

warranties. This statement finds both textual 56 and
54 See,

e.g , Matlack, Inc. v. Hupp Corp., 57 FRD 151
(ED Pa. 1972) 12 U.C.C. Rep. 420. ("We do believe that we
have the engine that will "fill the bill' in all
categories so far as your application is concerned").
.

55 0n purpose,

this element will be discussed in the
following paragraph dealing with the basis of the bargain.
56 Official Comment 8, S. 2-313 states:
"Concerning affirmations of value or a seller's opinion or
commendation under subsection (2), the basic question

25

judicial 5

supports. However, the presumption of reliance

is rebuttable when the seller proves that the buyer did not

in fact rely upon seller's representations. 58

Even though Official Comment

3

.

S.2-313 59 seems

particularly clear as to the non-requirement of reliance,
numerous cases evidenced that whenever seller's statements

induced the purchase the basis of the bargain test is
met. 60

Likewise there are some cases which denied buyer's

claim when he can not prove that he acted on the basis of
the seller's representations sx

Buyer's knowledge and

remains the same: what statements of the seller have in the
circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the
basis of the bargain? As indicated above, all statements
of the seller do so unless good reason is shown to the
contrary.
S7 The presumption of warranty is supported by Judge
Trobiner's opinion in Hauter v. Zogarts 14 Cal. 2d 104,
534 P. 2d 337, 16 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 938 (1975).
,

5S See

Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F.Sopp. 760 (ED
e.g
,
Pa. 1977) 21 U.C.C.Rep. 745, aff'd mem., 568 E2d 770 (3d
Cir. 1978), (in a horse sale the buyer relied on his
.

,

agent)
59 Official Comment 3, S.2-313 states in particular:
"In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the seller
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of
the description of the goods; hence no particular reliance

on such statements need be shown in order to weave them
into the fabric of the agreement."
6

°See, e.g , Palmer v. A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 684
P. 2d 187, 38 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 1150 (Colo. 1984); Fletcher v.
Coffee County Farmers Coop., 618 S.W.2d 490 (Tenn. Ct.
App.1984), 470 N.E.2d 137, 39 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 1239.
.

sl See , e.g , Hagenbuch v. Snap-On-Tools Corp., 339
F.Supp. 676 (DNH 1972), 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1142.; 490 P2d 475
(NM Ct.App. 1971), 9 U.C.C. Rep. 794, aff 'd on this point
497 P2d 732 NM 1972), 10 U.C.C. Rep. 1010.
.

.

(

,
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expertise are decisive to determine whether such a buyer

may have reasonably relied upon the seller's assertions.
The higher the buyer's knowledge, the less he has reason to

recklessly rely upon seller's statements and accordingly
the more he should

be able to draw the distinction between

express warranty and puffing. 52
122)

.

Issues related to some express warranties

Two major issues have to be addressed:

post-

agreement warranties (1221) and integration clauses (1222).
1221) Post-agreement warranties

Official Comment

7

S.

2-313 63 indicates that

seller's representations, even if made after the closing of
the deal, may amount to an enforceable express warranty.

No matter how clear is that comment there has been a split
amoung courts about its application.
ignored it. 64

Some courts simply

Others admitted that subsequent

s2 Thus,

to a large extent the basis of the bargain
test and the concept of puffing are interdependent.
7, S. 2-313 states:
words
of description or affirmation
"The precise time when
shown
is not material."
are made or samples are

"Official Comment

64 See,

Byrd Motor Lines Inc. v. Dunlop Tire &
e.g
Rubber Corp., 304 S.E.2d 773, 36 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 1169
(N.C.Ct.App. 1983); Cutherson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A. 2d
315, 34 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 71 (Me. 1982).
.

,

21

representations to a sale might constitute an actionable

modification of warranty. 55
It is somewhat difficult to contemplate in post-

agreement warranties a potential basis of the bargain.

Indeed how to conceive that a post-agreement induced the
purchase? A showing of reliance to characterize the basis
of the bargain should be thus discarded with respect to

post-agreement warranties.
1222) Integration or merger clauses
If the express warranty is spelled out in a writing

so that it appears to be a final expression of the parties'

intent the buyer is unlikely to prove prior or

contemporaneous written or oral express warranties.

This

is the result of the application of the parole evidence

rule. 65

A very carefully drafted merger clause 5

65 See

"

7

will

Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506 F2d 551 (2d
e.g
1974), 15 U.C.C. Rep. 769; Autzen v. John C.Taylor
Lumber Sales, Inc., 280 Or. 783, 572 P. 2d 1322, 23 U.C.C.
Rep.Serv. 304 (1977); Downie v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235,
39 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 427 (10th Circ. 1984).
,

.

,

Circ.

S6 S. 2-202 embodies the parole evicence rule:
"Terms with respect to which the confirmatory
memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set
forth in a writing intended by the parties as the final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as
are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of
any prior agreement or of a contemproaneous oral agreement
but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (S. 1-205)
or by course of performance (S. 2-209).
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless
the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the

agreement

28

prevent the buyer from alleging any affirmation,
representation, promise or warranty external to the
parties' written agreement. Actually, a merger clause

operates as a real disclaimer provided
all

2)

reguirements

of

S.

it

complies

with

2-316. ss

The specificity of the express warranty

under the french law

Express warranties are mostly to be drawn from the
general conditions of the contracts of sale. Two features
have to be highlighted: seller's warranty obligations are
time limited (21) and widen his obligations under the legal

warranty
21)

(

22)

As to the warranty period

One is most likely to find in general conditions of
sale contracts a precise warranty period which varies from
a few months to one year or even longer.

This express

warranty period must be clearly distinguished from the
short time-limit of Civ. C. Art. 1648. S9

Whereas the former

ev A good example of integration clause can be found in
& E.Coleman, Commercial and Consumer Warranties,
Ch.5, 5.09, 5-71:
"THIS AGREEMENT SIGNED BY BOTH PARITES
AND SO INITIALED BY BOTH PARTIES IN THE MARGIN OPPOSITE
THIS PARAGRAPH CONSTITUTES A FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION OF ALL
TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT AND IS A COMPLETE AND EXCLUSIVE
STATEMENT OF THOSE TERMS."

J.McDonnel

6S For a general discussion on disclaimers,
S9 C.Civ.Art.

See Ch.II).

"The action to which
1648 provides:
material defects give rise must be brought by the purchaser
within a short time-limit, depending upon the nature of the

29

limits the warranty period the latter has to do with a

limitation period to bring

a

warranty action. In other

words, the legal short delay compels the buyer to sue the

seller shortly after the defect has been discovered

whereas the express warranty period specifies the period

within which the defect must occur.
22)

As to the protection offered
It has here to be recalled that, under C.Civ. Art.

1641,

legal protection will be offered only if the defect

is hidden,

sufficiently grave, and existing prior to the

sale contract.

There is no doubt that express warranties

will also require the defect not to be conspicuous at the
time of the sale.

In contrast, express warranties appears

to be much less exacting as regards the pre-existing (221)

and seriousness (222) features of the defect.
221) As regards the pre-existing defect rule

In both legal and express warranties the seller is
not held liable for defects resulting from buyer's misuse
or fair wear and tear of the goods sold.

Thus, it is very

common for sellers to introduce into their general

conditions of sale explicit provisions such as: "The

warranty does not cover costs of repairing in case of

material defects, and the custom of the place where the
sale took place."

30

normal wear and tear of the sewing machine or accident
cause by misuse or lack of maintenance.""70
However, there is a substantial difference between
legal and express warranty in terms of proving a defect's

pre-existence.

Indeed, under Civ.C. 1641 and folowing, the

buyer is to prove the machine malfunctioning.

This may

sometimes be tough especially when the defect occurs long
after the sale.

In contrast, stipulating an express

warranty period amounts to presume the defect's preexistence during that entire period: whichever

malfunctioning may come up over the express warranty period
it is presumed to be caused by a manufacturing defect.

Conseguently, the buyer has not to prove it.

Ultimately,

the seller will have a hard time to rebut the presumption.

Only a showing of buyer's misuse of the machine might
relieve the seller of his liability.

warranty eguates with

a

Thus, express

good working warranty during a

certain period of time.
222) As regards the seriousness of the defect

According to the terms of Civ.C. Art. 1641, defects
that trigger the legal waranty must be of a certain

gravity.

Defects affecting the product usefulness are

considered whereas those related to its amenities are
simply neglected.

7

This distinction does not exist with

°Warranty clause of Singer sewing machines.
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express warranties.

Contract's provisions dealing with

warranty indicate only that the goods sold are guaranteed
for a certain period of time.

That is to say that express

warranties protect buyers against any kind of damage

provided that the damage occurs during the warranty period
and is not due to misuse of the product.

Whether or not

the damage complained of is included in the hidden defects
of Civ. C. Art.

1641 is of no significance. Put it another

way minor defects will be covered by the express warranty
whereas under the legal warranty they will not.
b) Relationships or links between legal

and express warranties

Generally speaking both warranties are conceived as
efficient tools for buyer to compel seller to implement one
of his most important obligations.

To what extent, under

both American and french laws, has such a purpose been
achieved?

1

)

Under the perspective of the American law
Actually, numerous express warranties describe goods

as being merchantable free of defects in material and

workmanship.

Likewise seller may also expressly warrant

that goods are fit for the buyer's special purposes 71
"

.

71 See , e.g ., Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel,
10 U.C.C.Rep. 57
Inc., 192 Nw2D 580 (Mich. Ct.App. 1971
(power crane); Acme Pump Co. v. National Cash Register Co.,
337 A2d 672 (Conn. CP 1974), 16 U.C.C.1242 (bookkeeping
)

machine)

,
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Indeed, as a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine

circumstances in the real world where the particular
purpose warranty will not be characterized as express. In
other words a written document is likely to be drafted when
the buyer wishes to get goods fit for a particular purpose.

Thus implied and express warranties may apparently cover
the same area. Yet, whenever there may be an overlap

between express and implied warranties, a cautious buyer
should allege both of them."72
Furthermore, before getting to the litigation stage,
an aggrieved buyer is much more likely to obtain

appropriate remedies from the seller if he can rest upon an
express warranty made by the seller. Indeed sellers are not
familiar with implied warranties.
The foregoing considerations have been largely

pragmatic.

They tended to point out that, even if express

warranties' content may embrace implied warranties, express

warranties of guality, particularly those reduced to
writing, are much more useful for buyers than warranties

implied in law.
This last comment may be equally drawn from french
legal and express warranties.

V2 Indeed both express and implied warranties
are subjected to various requisite conditions for their
characterization, See Ch.I) A) a) & B) a) supra.
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2)

Under the perspective of the french law

Relationships or links between express and legal

warranty have to be contemplated whether the express

warranty period is still running or not.
During the express warranty period, the express

warranty protection should primarily come into play.
Assuming the legal warranty features are also met, could
the buyer invoke the benefit of the legal warranty rather

than the express warranty protection?

And what if the

buyer has not complied with his own obligations under the
express warranty provisions?"73 Even in that case, the

buyer should be able to seek the legal warranty"74

protection if he is willing to do

so."75

It often happens that express warranties are not

enforceable because the warranty period is over.

The

relevant issue then is: is the aggrieved buyer allowed to
trigger then the legal warranty?

Judicial precedents'75

73

"

For instance, the buyer made the good be fixed by
someone who is not a manufacturer's representative.
74 See, e.g.
Civ., 07/15/1975, Bull. Civ. I, # 243,
204.:
as a matter of principle to have made the good fixed
,

by somebody else than the seller himself does not prevent
the aggrieved buyer from exercising his rights pursuant to
C. Civ. Art. 1641 and following.
7s The buyer may be willing to get the contract's
rescission, which is possible under the legal warranty and

may be not under the express warranty.
76 See, e_^g., Nice,

10/23/1957, Gaz. Pal., 1957, 2nd.
Tables; Poitiers, 11/22/1961, D.1962, Somm.18; Comm.
04/28/1971, J.C.P., 1972. II 17280, 2nd case; Comm.,
1977, 2nd. 434.
ll/08/1976m Gaz.Pal.
,
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and statutory provis ions'7
answer.

"

7

lead undoubtedly to a positive

However, a good deal of time will have necessarily

elapsed from the time of the sale and consequently the
buyer will be unlikely to prove that malfunctioning is the
result of a manufacturing defect and not of wear and tear
or misuse.

The foregoing considerations do not mean that a

warranty period stipulation is of no importance. All along
that period, the buyer is probably given a better

protection than under the legal warranty."781

But, the legal

warranty may either "preempt" the express warranty during
the express warranty period or outlast the express warranty

extinction.

77 Decree

protection.
78

'

# 78-373 related to consumers information and
(Decree of 03/24/1978).

See, Ch. I) B) a)

21)

&
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22)

supra.

CHAPTER

II

.

CONDITIONS

TO IMPLEMENT THE WARRANTY OF

QUALITY

Assuming the existence of a warranty of quality, it
will be only given effect if certain conditions are
satisfied: some of them are positive, others are negative.
As to positive conditions, they might be summed up in

the idea of causation.

Whereas the French approach is

rather to include the notion of causation within the hidden

defect warranty concept the American view is to clearly

distinguish the existence of a warranty from its breach and
to point out that damages suffered are due to the breach of

warranty*"79

The buyer is to prove two elements of causa-

The buyer has first to establish that the loss

tion:

sustained occurred because of the breach of the warranty,
thus because of the goods' defects. Accordingly, the buyer

has to show that the goods were defective at the time of
the sale' BO

Indeed, the warranty relates, as a matter of

"^Official Comment 13, S. 2-314 provides: "In an action
based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to
show not only the existence of the warranty but the fact
that the warranty was broken and that the breach of the
warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained. In
such an action an affirmative showing by the seller that
the seller resulted from some action or event following his
own delivery of the goods can operate as a defense."
8°

See, e.g., Q.Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v.Siter,
Pa. Super. 392, 398, 204 A. 2d 494, 497 (1964)
35

204
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principle, to the condition of goods at the time of the

contract or shipment. 81
In addition assuming the goods are both warrantied and

inherently defective, the buyer still has the burden to

demonstrate that "the breach of warranty was the proximate
cause of the loss sustained." 32

Whenever buyer's conduct

intervenes and lessens the connection between the breach
and the loss, he may be deprived of his right to get any
remedy. That is among others the case if the buyer know-

ingly used a defective product 83 or he failed to discover

defects he should have discovered. 84
U.C.C. S. 2-316(3) (b) 85 which deals with disclaimer

implied by examination (or non-examination) heavily supB:L

See

e.g

Prutch

v. Ford Motor Comp. , 574 P. 2d 102,
640 Colo. Ct App. 1977); Herbstman
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 8-9, 342 A. 2d 181, 184, 17
U.C.C. Rep. 39, 43 (1975) (consumer case).

105,

,

.

,

23 U.C.C. Rep. 637,

82 Official Comment 13,

.

(

S. 2-314 See

B3 Official Comment 5,

note 79.

S. 2-715 provides in part: ".
If the buyer did in fact discover the defect prior to his
use, the injury would not proximately result from the
breach of warranty."
.

84 Official Comment 13,

.

S. 2-314 in fine provides:
following
an examination of the goods
"Action by the buyer
which ought to have indicated the defect complained of can
be shown as matter bearing on whether the breach itself was
the cause of the injury."

BS S. 2-316
3) (b) provides:

"When the buyer before
entering into the contract has examined the goods or the
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard
to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances
to have revealed to him."
(
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ports this latter consideration.

Exactly like the con-

spicuousness defect test under the French law, buyer's
failure to undertake reasonable inspection of the goods and
to find out the defect he is complaining of will be basi-

cally determined under the following criterion: the buyer's

degree of expertise as to the goods purchased. 36
As regards negative conditions, the seller's warranty

obligations will only be triggered if the buyer does not
wait too long to file a suit

(A)

and does not face warranty

disclaimer's issue (B).
(A)

AS TO THE TIME ALLOWED TO BRING AN ACTION

Under both American

(a)

and French (b) systems,

express provisions specify a certain period of time during

which the aggrieved buyer may rightfully claim his rights.

B 6/

Official Comment

" A profes2-316 states:
sional buyer examining a product in his field will be held
to have assumed the risk as to all defects which a professional in the field ought to observe, while a nonprofessional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only for
such defects as a layman might be expected to observe."

S.

8,

General Instr.Corp. v. Pennsylvania
See e.g
Pressed Metals, Inc. 366 F.Supp. 139, 13 U.C. C.Rep. 829
,

.

,

(

506 F 2d 1051 (3d Circ. 1974):
1973), aff 'd mem.
a buyer's failure to discover that sleeve bearings for bomb
fuses were packed in oil of the wrong thickness barred him
from consequential damages. The nondiscovery was unreasonable because "a mere visual inspection of the whole
contents of the bag would at least have put anyone who
regularly handled these bearings on notice that something
was amiss." Id. at 149, 13 U.C. C.Rep. at 836.

M.D. Pa.

,

.
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a

The statute of limitations and the buyer's duty to give

^

notice or the U.C.C. requirements.

Under the U.C.C, the buyer has to be extremely vigilant as soon as he discovers some product's imperfections.
He has to bear in mind that he must bring his action within
a

certain period of time (1). In addition he is required to

notify the buyer of the alleged breach of warranty (2).
The statute of limitations (U.C.C. S 2-725)

I)

8-7

One may infer from S. 2-725 a principle (11) which may be

subject to exceptions (12).
II)

Principle
An action for breach of warranty must be commenced

within four years after tender of delivery is made.
The U.C.C. drafters have considered that the four

years period begins to run when the cause of action arises,
here when the breach of warranty occurs.

Surprisingly they

have adopted as a reference point for the breach of war-

ranty the tender of delivery.
S7 S.

One could regret that the

2-725 provides in its two first subsections:
(1) "An action for breach of any contract for sale must be
commenced within four years after the cause of action has
accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce
the period of limitation to not less than one year but may
not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the
breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved pary's lack of
kmowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when
tender of delivery is made, except where a warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is
or should have been discovered."
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starting point of the four-year period not be the discovery
of the breach.

Nevertheless, this quite long period of

time to bring an action and the certainty secured as to its

computation might very well counterbalance unfairness that
could result for cases where goods' defects appeared after
the four-year period had elapsed.
12) Exceptions

Contracting parties may modify the period of limiThere are two means whereby contracting parties

tation.

may depart from the period generally allowed to bring an
action for breach of warranty: the future performance

exception (121) and an agreement to reduce the period of
limitation (122).
121

)

The future performance exception

The computation of the four year period might start
from the discovery of the defect" where a warranty explic-

itly extends to future performance of the goods and dis-

covery of the breach must await such performance." 88

The

word "explicitly" leads to consider that only express

warranties might create the future performance exception.
Indeed courts have never recognized that implied warranties

l

S.

2-725(2), See note 87/ supra
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may be concerned. B9

That is not to say that any express

warranty necessarily extends to future performance. The
express warranty must look to the future, namely provide a
specific durational promise for the goods.

An express

warranty stating that the goods will perform in

a

certain

way or be free of defects for a certain period of time
suspends the clock until discovery of breach and gives four
years from discovery to bring suit for breach of the
express warranty. 90
122

)

An agreement to reduce the period of limitation
It is up to the contracting parties to reduce in their

agreement the period of limitation to not less than one
year
But they have to be careful in the drafting of the

contractual reduction.

They must expressly indicate that

the suit is to be brought within a certain period of time

after the cause of action has accrued.

B9 See,

Wording creating

Grand Island School Dist. No. 2
e.g
Corp., 279 NW2d 603 (Neb. 1979), 26 U C.C.Rep. 939
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F2d 737
1979), 26 U. C.C.Rep. 1162; South Burlington School
Calcagni-Frazier-Zajchowski Architects, Inc., 410
(Vt.1980), 28 U. C.C.Rep. 1382.
.

,

.

9

v.Celotex
Triangle
2d Circ.
Dist. v.
A2d 1359

Inc. v. Mitchell, 252 S.E.2d 672
°U. S. Indus.
(express
(Ga.Ct.App. 1979), 26 U.C.C. Rep. 90 See, e^.
warranty that poultry cages sold to plaintiff had been
treated to prevent rusting for 10 years).
,

,
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limited remedies 91 or express warranties of limited

duration 92 or language indicated specific time in which
the buyer must notify the seller does not equate with an

agreement to reduce the period of limitation to bring a
suit.

In addition to the statute of limitation requirement,
the aggrieved buyer, prior to the litigation stage, has to

comply with another duty: to give the seller notice of the

breach of warranty.
2)

The buyer's duty to give notice (U.C.C.

S

.

2-07

(

3

)

(

a)

93

It is clear from S. 2-607(3) (a) that failure to give

timely notice of the breach deprives the buyer of any
remedy.

The stringency of such a rule induces the follow-

ing issues to be examined: What should be the notice like?
(21), What is a reasonable time to give notice?

is to be notified?

(22), Who

(23)

91 A warranty that sets a period of one year in which

the seller will repair or replace defective parts does not
reduce the statute of limitation to one year.
92 In Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451,
357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 15 U.C.C. Rep. 102(Sup.Ct. 1974), seller's
warranty covered defects for "a period of 12 months or

12,000 miles, whichever occurs the first." The court
rejected seller's claim that this language reduced the
period of limitation to one year.
93 S.

" Where a tender has been
2-607(3) (a) provides:
reasonable time after he
a
within
must
buyer
accepted, the
any breach notify the
discovered
have
should
discovers or
from
any remedy."
barred
be
or
breach
seller of the
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21) What should be the notice like?

The primary purpose behind the notice requirement is
to afford the seller an opportunity to voluntarily remedy

the problem and consequently to avoid needless litigation.

That is why a proper notice should only be such as informing the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a

breach.

The concept of notice is thus broadly conceived: a

written notice is the best but an oral notice is sufficient. 94

No magic words are necessary:

whenever the

seller may be deemed alerted of the breach of warranty an

appropriate notice has been given. 95
22

What is a reasonable time to give notice?

What amounts to a reasonable time depends upon the
circumstances and the kind of product involved.

Courts

will treat differently the timeliness of notice when the
buyer is a mere consumer or a merchant buyer. 96

The rule

94 See,

e.g ., Oregon Lumber Co. v. Dwyer Overseas
Timber Prods. Co., 571 P2d 884 (Ore. 1977), 23 U. C. C.Rep. 87
Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Mai ley, 329 F2d 585 (8th Circ.
1964), 2 U.C. C.Rep. 110 (seller did not receive formal
written notice of defects in helicopter until more than one
year after delivery, but deller's general awareness of malfunctions long before that time constituted sufficient
notice.
1

95 See, e.g
Alafoss, h.f. v. Premium Corp. of
America, 599 F2d 232 (8th Cir. 1979), 26 U.C. C.Rep. 832.
.

,

96 Official Comment 4, S. 2-607(3) (a) makes clear that:
"The time of notification is to be determined by applying
commercial standards to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable
time" for notification from a retail consumer is to be
judged by different standards so that in the case it will
be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is
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will be more liberally applied to the former.

Courts take

also into consideration the nature of the goods sold.

Notice should be promptly given for perishable goods.

9

"

7

The starting point of the period of time to give notice is

when the buyer discovers or should have discovered
seller's breach of warranty.

For a latent defect courts

will be more flexible as to the computation of the delay to
give notice. 9S

23

)

Who is to be notified?
Nowadays it is more than freguent that a product goes

through a long chain of distribution and the guestion thus
is whether whom the retail buyer has to give notice to.

designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a
good faith consumer of his remedy."
97 See

e.g
Maine Potato Growers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Co-op Potato Growers, Inc., 9 U.C.C.Rep. 842 (US
Dept.Ag. 1971): 12 days too long for rotten potatoes.;
Mazur Bros. v. Jaffe Fish Co., 3 U.C.C.Rep. 419 (Vet. Adm.
CAB, 1965): delay of five days in notifying local supplier
of defective raw shrimp is too long)
,

.

,

9B See, e.g ., Waddell v. American Breeders Serv. , Inc.,
161 Mont. 221, 505 P2d 417, 11 U.C.C.Rep. 1157 (1973): a
cattle bought semen for artificial insemination of his
cows. The buyer put the insemination cows in a pasture with
a "clean-up" bull to cover any cows that had not been

successfully impregnated. When the buyer discovered that
the clean-up bull was "overused", he replaced it with
another bull. Months later, when the failure of his calf
crop made it clear that the semen had been defective, the
buyer notified and sued the seller. The seller protested
that the buyer should have given notice when he replaced
the clean-up bull; he should have known that the semen was
not working when he saw how hard the bull was working.
Unpersuaded, the Court held that the buyer's later notice
was timely.
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There is no doubt that failure to give notice to the
immediate seller bars a warranty action against the latter.
The issue is rather whether the remote manufacturer, if
sued, may be able to raise the failure to give notice as an

available defense.

The Courts' trend, especially where

economic loss is involved, is to require the aggrieved

purchaser to notify the manufacturer."

Indeed it seems

logical to compel the purchaser to fulfill such a duty when
he is given the right to pursue on a warranty theory a

member of the chain of distribution with whom he had no

contractual relationships. 100
xo:L
b) The short-time limit of C.Civ. Art 1648
.

No matter how well-founded a buyer's claim is as
regards the breach of quality, he may be barred from any

recovery if he tardily files a suit.

That is substantially

the understanding of Art. 1648 which compels the buyer to

bring an action within a brief delay.

This is trial

•"

Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron
See e.g
Works, Inc., 605 P2d 806 (Wyo. 1980), 28 U.C.C. Rep. 356;
McCunev. Alioto Fish Co., 597 F.2d 1244 (9th Circ. 1979),
26 U.C.C. Rep. 912.
,

.

,

xoo For a general discussion on privity issues, See
Ch. IV.

xox C.Civ. Art.

material
within a
material
sale has

"The action to which
1648 provides:
defects give rise must be brought by the purchaser
short-time limit, depending upon the nature of the
defects, and the custom of the place where the
teaken place."
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courts' duty to determine whether the buyer has complied

with the short-time limit requirement.
Two issues as to the application of such a rule have
to be addressed:

What is the starting point of the short-

time limit? (1)

What is the length of the short-time limit?
1)

(2)

The starting point of the short-time limit
As matter of principle, the clock starts ticking as

soon as the buyer discovers or should have discovered the
defects. 102

There is a split among courts as to the con-

struction of such a principle. Actually it may be inter-

preted in two different ways. The delay's computation may
start running from the very day when the goods stops

working, which makes the buyer aware of the unfitness of
the thing for its intended use. 103

The start of the short-time limit may also be delayed

until the purchaser knows what was the exact nature of the
goods' defects.

This latter approach seems to be favored

by the majority of courts which consider that only an
104
expert's report will give prominence to hidden defects.

102 See, e_^., Comm. 12/03/1957, Bull. Civ. Ill, # 332;
Comm. 05/04/1971, Bull. Civ. IV, # 122; Comm. 0218/1974,
J.C.P. 1974. II. 17798; Comm. 12/09/1975, D.1976. Somm.28.
103 For cases supporting this view, See e.g
Comm.
12.
D.1974.Somm.
11/21/1973
Civ.
,
139;
D.1972.
10/11/1971,
,

104 See,

e^.^iv.

.

,

05/16/1973, J.C.P. 1975. II. 17932;
Somm.108; Comm. 02/16/1972,
D.1975
Amiens, 03/20/1975,
D.1977, I.R.248.
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Indeed, prior to the expert's report communication, there
is still doubt as to whether product's unfitness is due

rather to a misuse of the buyer than to a real hidden
defect. Practically speaking the sole expert's assistance

will reveal and prove the defect's existence which so far

could be only suspected. Consequently, it would be fair to

delay the short-time period's computation until the report
of the expert indicates the defect's nature. xos
2)

The length of the short-time limit

What is to be understood from a "brief delay"?

The

appraisal of such a limit will depend on the nature of the
goods sold and the circumstances surrounding the case.

One

can not lay down the same time to claim for sophisticated

material's defects and for mere household defective equipment.

Even for similar products, a great diversity of

short-time limit's estimation has to be noted. 106

In the

real world, it frequently happens that before getting to
the litigation stage, the buyer will try to obtain an

informal dispute settlement with the seller.

Some courts

105 See, for a good example supporting this view,
Comm. 10/24/1962, D.1962. 46.
los For cases dealing with cars, See e.g
Civ.
one
year
(delay
of
held
reason07/10/1956, D.1956. 719
able) Comm. 10/03/1956, G. P. 1956, 2, 323 (twenty months not
(delay of
too long) Comm. 12/13/1973, Bui. Civ. IV, # 372
T.I. Nimes,
two years acceptable). In contrast, See e,g
02/24/1970, J.C.P.1971.IV.153 (eight months too long).
six months too
T.G.I.Colmar, 12/09/1977, D.1979, 505.
long)
.

,

,

(

.

,

,
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simply denied any interrupting effect to informal dispute

settlement's attempts. 107
Some others, on the contrary, admitted that while the

buyer is trying to get a compromise with the buyer he
should not be expected to file a suit. los

Indeed this

latter approach seems to be adopted to business transactions and thus more realistic.
B)

AS TO WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS

As a preliminary comment, it is noteworthy that both

systems approach differently warranty disclaimer and remedy

limitations issues: the square point of view of the French
law contrasts with the subtle nuance of the American law.

The former simply equates the warranty limitations'

regime with that of warranty disclaimers, which renders of
no avail any conceptual distinction.

The latter, on the

contrary, clearly distinguishes warranty exclusions which

negate any express or implied warranty obligations from

warranty limitations which only determine available
remedies once a breach has occured.

Accordingly, the

U.C.C. provides two distinct procedures for disclaiming

warranties

(S. 2-316)

107 See,

and for limiting remedies (S. 2-718

e^.,

Comm. 02/02/1971, Bull. Civ. IV, # 34;
Bull.
Civ. I, # 325; Colmar, 12/09/1977,
Civ. 11/12/1975,
See note 106 supra.

108 See,

e^., Civ. 07/10/1956, D.1956., 719; Comm.
10/24/1962, D.1962. 46; Paris, 12/09/1968, D.1969.
Somm. 42;
Rouen, 02/14/1979, D.1980, I.R. 223.

&
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2-719) and expressly builds up a bridge between the two

sets of provisions. 109

That is why remedy limitations will

more appropriately be discussed in the next chapter. 110

Generally speaking warranty disclaimers policies are
inspired by two different and sometimes inconsistent
considerations: on the one hand, the freedom of contract
and on the other hand, the buyer's protection, in particular, the final consumer.

Whereas the American view is rather to favour the
former (a), the French one is fully inclined to opt for
the latter (b)

a)

Warrranty Disclaimers under the American Law

:

An efficient tool of defense for the seller.
It seems appropriate to divide the following develop-

ments into two parts.

First, we will give an overview of

the basic rules governing the validity of disclaimers in
the most frequent context they may occur, namely when the

seller attempts to negate his warranty obligations implied

by law

(

1)

109 S.

2-316 (4) provides:
"Remedies for breach of
warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions
of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and
on contractual modification of remedy (S. 2-718 & 2-719."
110 For a general discussion on remedies for breach of
warranty, See Ch.III.

49

We will then have to address specific issues

(2)

raised by some warranty disclaimers: express warranty

disclaimers and the "as is" stipulation.
I

General rules governing warranty disclaimers

'

s

validity

Generally speaking, the implied warranties of mer-

chantability and fitness for
subject of being disclaimed.

a

particular purpose are
To achieve such a purpose,

the seller is to strictly follow some requirements set

forth in

S.

2-316 (2)

(11).

Whenever sale of consumer goods

is involved, the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act 111 may be

applicable and secure a greater protection to consumers
(12).

II)

The S. 2-316(2) requirements 112
In order to disclaim his implied warranty of mer-

chantability, the seller has to straightforwardly comply

with two requirements: his warranty disclaimer must mention

merchantability (111) and be conspicuous (112). Ultimately,

1X1 15 USC Subsection 2301-2312
1:L2

(1982).

"Subject to subsection (3),
S. 2-316( 2) provides:
to exclude or to modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose the exclusion must be
in writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."
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he may face the problem of the unconscionability of his

otherwise valid disclaimer (113).
Ill) The language to be mentioned

A failure to use the word "merchantability" is more

than likely to equate with a court's refusal to uphold the

warranty of merchantability disclaimer. 113

Only few

decisions ignored the merchantability requirement. 114
Unlike a disclaimer of merchantability, disclaimers of

warranty for fitness for

particular purpose may be found

a

in a general language and hence no "magic words" are

necessary.

Likewise, a disclaimer of fitness for a

particular purpose must be in writing whereas

a

disclaimer

of merchantability may be oral.

From these last considerations, one may humbly
formulate the following comments.

A seller willing to

113 See, e.g
Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co. , 407
F.Supp. 940 (ED Tenn.1976)
19U.C.C.Rep. 145: "All
.

,

,

warranties, express, implied and statutory, shall terminate
upon final acceptance of the work covered by this
contract." not held effective. Discount Drug Corp. v.
Honeywell Protection Servs., Div. of Honeywell, Inc., 450
34 U.C.C.Rep. 491: "Except as
A2d 49 Pa. Super. Ct. 1982
may be provided elsewhere in the agreement, it is not the
intention of the parties that the the contractor assume
responsibility for any loss due to contractor's negligent
performance or failure to perform under this agreement or
for any loss or damge sustained through burglary, theft,
fire, or any other clause." not recognized as a disclaimer.
(

)

,

114 For a good example, See Rotho-Lith, Ltd v. F.P.
Barlett & Co., 297 F2D 497 (1st Cir. 1962), 1 U.C.C.Rep.
73: "Any and all warranties, guarantees, or representations
whatsoever are excluded." uphold as disclaimer.
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disclaim implied, warranties is unlikely to use oral
disclaimers which are by nature subject to evidence
problems.

Therefore oral warranty disclaimers rarely occur

and may not be upheld because of the parol evidence rule.
It would have been more consistent to require "magic words"
to create a disclaimer of warranty of fitness for a

particular purpose and only a general language to render
effective a warranty of merchantability disclaimer. Indeed,
the former is peculiar and should be underscored by a

specific disclamatory language while the latter, which
tends to negate a general warranty 115 should require

general disclamatory language.
112) The conspicuousness requirement

The conspicuousness test it is construed as strictly

by courts.

S. 1-201

(

10 116 gives a definition and examples

of what is a conspicuous language.
S. 1-201 (10)

Official Comment 10 to

specifies that "the test is whether attention

can reasonably be expected to be called to it."

The test

will be perfectly satisfied whenever the disclaimer appears
115 S. 2-314 sets forth six different criteria of

merchantability
lie S. 1-201( 10) provides:
"Conspicuous": A term of
clause is conspicuous when it is so written that a
reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to
have noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NONNEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the
body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is a larger or other
contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated
term is "conspicuous." Whether a term of clause is
"conspicuous" or not is for decision by the court.
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on the front of the form, is printed in a larger type than
the rest of the form and is closed to the buyer's signature
space.

That is why the case law is full of decisions

holding disclaimers invalid if not printed in contrasting
type or color 11 7 or if mentioned on the reverse of the
"

form with no language on the front calling attention to
it. xxa

113) The issue of the unconscionability of a warranty

disclaimer
One may wonder whether a warranty waiver in complete

conformity with

S.

2-316 requirements, as earlier dicussed,

may be declared unconscionable under S.2-302 :l:l9 and
therefore not be enforced.
In other words, should the specific provision, namely
117 See , e.g , Tribble Trucking Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 14 U.C.C. Rep. 63 (ND Ga. 1973) (too slight
460
DeLamar Motor Co. v. White
a contrast in type)
S.W.2d 802 (Ark. 1970), 8 U.C.C. Rep. 437 (Pa.Ct.CP 1966)
(slight variation in type not enough to do job).
.

.

,

118 See , e.g
Hunt v. Perkins Mach.Co., 226 N.E.2d 228
(Mass. 1967), 4 U.C.C. Rep. 281; Massey-Ferguson v. Utley,
439 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct.App. 1969), 6 U.C.C. Rep. 51
(disclaimer on back of form referred to by words on front
in only ordinary type)
.

1:L9

,

"If the court as a matter of
S. 2-302( 1) provides:
law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
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S.

2-316, prevail over the general provision, S. 2-302, and

not be thwarted by the unconscionability theory?

According to Professor Arthur Leff, 120 the answer is

definitely positive. He pointed out that the extreme preciseness of

S.

2-316 and the cross reference with general

concepts like course of dealing, course of performance or
trade usage but not unconscionability were strong arguments
in favor of the preemption of S. 2-316 over S. 2-302.

Courts' attitude towards this issue reveals some uncer-

decisions may be found on both directions

tainty:

12:L

We

will allow ourselves to rather support the preemptive view

resting upon the following factors.

Courts have

distinguished two types of unconscionability: procedural
and substantive unconscionability.
The former tends to protect consent's impairment of
the party

who, because of a lack of bargaining power, is

forced to accept a "take it or leave it" transaction or,

because of a lack of sophistication, may underestimate the

warranty disclaimer's significance.
12 °Leff

The uneguivocal

"Unconscionability and the Code - The
Emporor's New Clause," 115 U.Pa.L.Rev. 485 (1967)
/

12:L

for cases deeming unconscionable some
See, e.g
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. V. Smith,
warranty disclaimers:
Law Div. 1968), 5 U.C.C. Rep. 30
Ct.
Super.
J
N
2d
195
240 A.
Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513
Rambler,
V.
Holiday
Murray
.

,

(

(Wise. 1978),

24 U.C.C. Rep.

584.

for cases supporting the preemptive view:
Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 154 S.E.2d 177 (Va.
Inc., 369
1967), 4 U.C.C. Rep. 172 Koehring Co. V. A.P.I.
U.C.C.
Rep.
368.
14
1974)
F.Supp. 882 (ED Mich.

See

,

e.g

.

,

,
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guidelines of

S.

2-316 and especially the conspicuous

requirement seem to completely set aside this fear that a

disclaimer be not brought to the buyer's attention.

As to

the inequality of bargaining power, it should be primarily

invoked in consumers sale in which the Magnusson-Moss
'

Warranty Act may be able to come into play and therefore
ensure

a

appropriate protection to the consumer. 122

With respect to the substantive unconscionability, one
may say that its purpose is to avoid enforcing clauses
which are per se of a particular harsh impact. Taking into
account that unconscionability is to be measured at the
time the contract was made, it merely would mean that S.2316 would be of no more relevance since it would make no

sense to comply with a provision

whose effect is under-

mined by another: what would be expressly recognized under
S. 2-316,

namely disclaiming warranty, would be deemed

substantively unconscionable under

S. 2-302.

We consequently are inclined to think that the

unconscionability theory should not interfere and strike
down a properly drafted warranty disclaimer.
12) The Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act impact in the sale of

consumer goods.
As a matter of principle attempts by the seller to

disclaim warranty liability are limited with respect to

122 For a general discussion, See Ch.II. B) a)

12).
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consumer transactions.

Before getting to the particular

issue of warranty disclaimers in consumers sale of goods,
it seems necessary to identify the scope of the Magnusson-

Moss Warranty Act.
It covers the sale of both new and used consumer

product.

A consumer is anyone who buys a consumer product

for purposes other than resale.

A consumer product means

any tangible personal property which is normally used for

personal, family or household purposes. In that context,
the Warranty Act to written warranties to consumers on

consumer products.

That is not to say that sellers are

under compulsion to issue written warranties.

The Warranty

Act continues to let sellers decide whether it should to

their benefit to provide written warranties to consumers.
If they elect to do so, sellers will face to provide a full

or limited warranty 123 depending upon whether the warranty

meets the federal minimum standards. 124
123 15 USC Section 2303

(a)

However, it is

(1982).

124 15 USC Section 2304 (1982) provides in part "In
order for a warrantor warranting a consumer product by
means of a written to meet the federal minimum standards
for warranty
(1) such warrantor must as a minimum remedy such
consumer product within a reasonable time and without
charge in the case of a defect, malfunction, or failure to

conform with such written warranty;
(2) notwithstanding section 108(b) [15 USCS Sub.S.
2308(b)], such warrantor may not impose any limitation on
the duration of any implied warranty on the product;
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential damages for breach of any written or implied
warranty on such product, unless such exclusion or
limitation conspicuously appears on the face of the
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noteworthy that whether or not the warranty is full or
limited, no disclaimer or modification of implied warranty
is permissible if a written warranty is given. 125

If the

warrantor offers a full warranty, he may not impose any
limitation on the duration of any implied warranty nor
restrict the general four year period from the date of sale
to bring an action pursuant to the statute of limitation.
In contrast, a limted warranty can limit implied warranties
to the duration of the written warranty if the limitation
is conscionable and displayed on the face of the war-

ranty. 125

The distinction between full and limited warranties
also affects remedy limitations. 12

"

7

In sum, a common

language like "All warranties express or implied are

hereby disclaimed" are not given effect for consumer
transactions pursuant to the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act.

2)

Special related issues

warranty; and
(4) if the product (or component part thereof) contains
a defect or malfunction after a reasonable of attempts by
the warrantor to remedy defects or malfunction in such
product, such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect
either a refund for, or replacement without charge of, such
product or part (as the case may be).
125 15 USC Section 2308 (a)

(1982).

126 15 USC Section 2308 (b)

(1982).

12V For a general discussion, See Ch. III.

->

I

Because of their peculiarity or their distinctive

treatment under the American law two issues have to be
addressed:
is" clause

21)

Express warranty disclaimers (21) and the "as
(

22)

Express warranty disclaimers
As a matter of principle, once an express warranty has

been made it is virtually impossible to disclaim it. 128

It

is even surprising to consider such problem in the sense

that it is necessarily inconsistent to formulate a state-

ment and thereafter to deny it.

But, as we have seen the

concept of express warranty is so broad that an express

warranty may have been created without the seller's actual
awareness. 129

Anyway, in spite of the general notion that

express warranties are mostly express and should not conse-

quently be disclaimable after their creation, the U.C.C.
drafters specifically addressed such an issue and pro-

hibited unreasonable post-creation disclaimers.

128 0fficial Comment

"A
4, S. 2-313 provides in part:
clause generally disclaiming "all warranties, express or
implied" can not reduce the seller's obligation with
respect to such description and therefore can not be given
literal effect under S. 2-316."

X29 In particular warranty created by description,
sample or model.
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Thus, S. 2-316 (1) 13 ° makes it clear that language or

conduct of disclaimer of warranty is to be construed con-

sistently with

language or conduct of disclaimer and

whenever such a construction is not reasonble the language
or conduct of warranty is to be given effect. There is no

shortage of cases that simply have ignored attempts to

disclaim express warranties after one has been created. 131
22) The "as is" clause

Practically as well as legally speaking, the "as is"
stipulation deserves particular attention. Indeed in business practices especially for the sale of used goods, "as
is" clauses are very frequent.

Moreover the "as is"

stipulation may be even used for new goods by dealers who
want to negate their own implied warranty obligations and
only pass the manufacturer's express warranty through to
the ultimate buyer. 132
13 °S. 2-316

"Words or conduct relevant
(1) provides:
to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct
tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but
subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or
extrinsic evidence (S. 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable
131 See, e.g

Community Television Serv. Inc. v.
Dresser Indus., 586 F.2d 637 (8th Circ. 1978), cert. denied
441 U.S. 932 (1979); Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 173 Mot.
345,

.

567 P. 2d 916

,

(1977)

,

.

132 Under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act, the

manufacturer who markets goods with an express warranty
cannot disclaim the Code implied warranties, but the dealer
is free to do so if he makes no independent warranties (15
USC Section 2308 a) 1976)
(

(
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In addition, and even if S. 2-316

(

3

)

(

a)

X33 is specifi-

cally devoted to defining what the legal impact of "as is"

stipulation should be, it is paradoxical to note that
U.C.C. drafters seem to have rather generated than solved

problems by addressing the "as is' clause the way they did:
"

Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied

warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is"".

With no further reguirements

,

S.

2-316(3) (a) may cut

down the stringency and preciseness of

S.

2-316(2) to

enforce implied warranties disclaimers in the sense that it
cannot be strictly inferred from the language of S.2316(3) (a) that there is any reguirement of writing, mention
:L34

of merchantability and conspicuousness

Would it be to

say that an "as is" stipulation is the safest way for the

seller to disclaim his implied warranties obligations and a

complete substitute for
negative.

S.

2-316(2)? The answer is certainly

First, as suggests S. 2-316

(

3

)

(

a)

itself and also

133 S.2-316( 3) (a) provides:
"Unless the circumstances
indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other
language which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain
that there is no implied warranty."
134 This statement is supported by a textual argument:
S. 2-316 (3) (a) starts with the following precision: "Notwithstanding subsection (2) "which tends to make independent each of the two provisions.
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its Official Comment

7

1-

35 courts should test whether
the

language used, namely the "as is" clause, is commonly

understood to exclude warranties.

A consumer buyer may for

instance contend that he is unaware of what the "as is"
language means so that the circumstances negate the alleged
disclaimer. 135

Second, any use of synonymous language like

"in its present condition", "as and where it stands" or

"what you see is what you get" may not be construed by

courts as commonly understood as a disclaimer. 1 37
-

Third

and most important, courts have approached the issue of

effectiveness of an "as is" clause by asking whether the
language was placed in the agreement so as to draw the

buyer's attention.

One will notice that it is sguarely

equivalent to the conspicuousness test.

Thus, although

conspicuousness is not explicitly by the Code, the majority
of cases, highlighting the necessity of protecting buyers

from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer hold
135 Official Comment 7, S. 2-316 3
a) provides in part
with
deals
general terms
Subsection
"Paragraph (a) of
(3)
"with
all
faults" and the
stand",
they
such as "as is", "as
like.
Such terms in ordinary commercial usage are understood to
mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as to the quality
of the goods involved."
(

X36 See, e.g

.

,

(

Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977), 22 U
13-7

)

.

C. C .Rep.

1141

Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc.
e.g
SD 1977), 22 U.C.C.Rep. 351: ("we accept no
254 NW2d 133
responsibility" not enough to qualify as "as is" sale.)
See

.

,

(

,
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inconspicuous disclaimers ineffective. 138

This case law

trend seems to be consistent with the general policy

underlying

S.

2-316 which allows sellers to avoid their

warranty obligations provided they give the buyer fair

warning of their intent.

"

One may add that the "as is

stipulation is of no effect towards express warranties. 139
This might be interesting in case of written representations of the goods by the seller.
As to oral express warranties, they will be overcome

by

a

subsequent written "as is" stipulation as a form of

merger clause under the parol evidence rule. 140
As a matter of conclusion on warranty disclaimers

under the American law, let's point out that under S.2316(3) (b) and S 2-316
.

(

3

)

(

c)

,

two other kinds of warranty

disclaimers are contemplated: disclaimer by prior examination of the goods and disclaimer by course of dealing,
trade usage or course of performance.

The former has been

13S See, e.g , Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking
Corp., Ill N.J. Super. 383, 268 A. 2d 345, 351 (1970);
Woodruff v. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop., 153 Ind.App.
31, 286 N.E.2d 188 (1972) (commercial transaction);
MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977
.

)

139 See, e.g , Bill Spreen Toyota, Inc. v. Jenguin
294 S.E.2d 533 (Ga.Ct.App. 1982), 35 U.C.C. Rep. 419.
.

X4 °See, e.g

Avery v. Aladdin Prods. Div., Nat'l
Servs. Indus., Inc., 128 Ga.App. 266, 196 S.E.2d 357, 12
U.C.C. Rep. 628 (1973): an "as is" stipulation held to
excluse evidence of oral alleged representations by the
seller that machinery was sold in "good condition."
.

,
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already discussed in this Chapter through the notion of

causation which relieves the seller of his liability

whenever the buyer's conduct has interf erred and consequently caused the loss sustained.

The latter appears as

not deserving a particular focus since other Code provi-

sions make clear that course of performance, trade usage or

course of dealing may supplement the parties agreement
'

X4:L
.

Moreover, our purpose is to explain how to normally

create a warranty disclaimer rather than to set forth how

otherwise ineffectual disclaimer clause may be given effect
because of a trade usage or course of dealing.
b)

Warranty Disclaimers under the French Law

:

An unworkable means of defense for sellers.
As a preliminary comment, it has to be underlined that

unlike the American legal system the French one simply
equates warranty waiver clause with remedy limitations
clause as to their applicable legal regime.

That is why,

as a matter of convenience, we will often refer to a unique

terminology: warranty-limiting clause.

Warranty waivers' regime under the French law is
certainly one of the most striking examples of difference

14:L

Among others, S. 1-205(3) indicates that a course of
dealing or trade usage may "give particular meaning to and
supplement or qualify terms of an agreement". Likewise S.2208(1) makes course of performance "relevant to determine
the meaning of the agreement." Moreover, S. 2-202 enables
all these three types of evidence to supplement the terms
of a written agreement.
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which may exist between a text and its construction by
courts. Indeed C.Civ. drafters, through Article 1643 142

,

distinguish the seller who knew the defects of the thing
and the seller who did not X43

.

According to Article 1643,

warranty-limiting clauses are valid if the seller was
unaware of the goods' defects.
Courts, by an audacious construction of Article 1643,

have substituted to the C. Civ. distinction between good
and bad faith sellers another one between the occasional
seller, always subject to the common law and consequently

presumed of good faith, and the professional seller, always
deemed a bad faith seller.
Therefore, as most of sales involve a professional
seller, warranty-limiting clauses are void (1). The fore-

going principle may admit exception when the sale takes
place between experienced professionals (2).
1)

Principle

:

Avoidance of warranty-limiting clauses.

Inspired by a permanent concern to indemnify victims
to the most liberal extent possible, the French case law

has negated warranty-limiting clauses efficacy (11). This
'

judicial hostility towards warranty-restricting clauses and
:L42

"The seller is liable for
Article 1643 provides:
hidden defects, even he did not know of them, unless, in
such a case, he had stipulated that he would not be
obligated for any warranty."
143 The same opposition is equally important as to the
extent of recoverable damages: for a general discussion,
See Ch.III: Remedies for breach of warranty.
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the current trend of consumer protection blossomed into a

legislative reality with the "Scrivener Act". 144 (12)
11

)

The case law hostility vis-a-vis warranty disclaimers

:

French courts have assimilated professional sellers
and manufacturers to sellers who knew the defects of the

thing sold or on account of their profession could not be

ignorant of them and consequently have denied any efficacy
to warranty disclaimers. 145

Indeed are void not only sheer

waiver clauses 146 but warranty-restricting clauses such as
limiting warranty obligations to defective product

replacement 14

"

7

or to parts and workmanship, 14S defining a

very short period of time to bring an action for breach of

warranty 149 or setting up

a six

months warranty 150

To the

.

extent all those clauses tend to negate the legal warranty
144 Act

#

and
145 See

78-23 (01/10/1978) on consumers information
protection.
'

e.g. , Req. 06/05/1929, Gaz.Pal. 1929.2.433;
Comm. 05/31/1949, Bull. Civ. I, # 221, 621; Comm. 10/24/1961,
Comm. 05/30/1967, D.1967, 511; Comm.
D.1962, 46;
07/20/1973, Bull. Civ. IV, # 254 36; Comm. 10/17/1977, Gaz
Pal. 1978.1.221.; Comm. 05/05/1982, D.1982, I.R. 358.
/

146 See, e.g.. Civ. 05/27/1969, J.C.P. 1969.11.16102;
Comm. 11/04/1970, D. 1971. 188; Comm. 01/29/1974, D. 1974. 268.
147 See, e^g., Comm.

07/29/1973, Bull. Civ. IV.

148 See, e.g., Comm.

10/14/1980, J.C.P. 1981. IV.

264,

#

,

236.

149 See, e^g.,
Comm. 01/30/1952, Bull .Civ. Ill
51; Comm. 12/17/1973,
37; Comm. 06/04/1969 ,D. 1971
Gaz. Pal. 1974. 1.428.

#

,

47,

,

15 °See,

e^.,

Comm.

12/07/1976, Gaz .Pal. 1977

.

2

.

433

.
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for concealed defects, they are of no effect whereas they

may be sustained for minor defects which, by nature, are
not within the scope of Article 1641.
It seems necessary to add that the presumption of

knowledge of the defect against professional sellers is
irrebutable: French case law does not admit contrary
evidence, nor allow, as a cause of exoneration, the tech-

nical impossibility of discovering the defect. 131

It is

unavailing for the seller to contend that he was unaware
of the defect because he was using a new technique or new

materials whose dangers were unknown and could only be
revealed through their actual use. 152

Generally speaking and in sum, an express warranty
should never deprive buyers from alleging the legal

warranty whenever the Article 1641 and following are
met 153 and even if there is an "as is" stipulation in the
contract. 154

This severe case law towards sellers found a

statutory echo in the "Scrivener Act" on consumer's

information and protection.
151 See,

e_!_g.

/

Comm.

11/27/1973, 1973, J. C. P. 1974 .II 17887
.

152 See, e^g., Civ., 07/17/1972, Bull. Civ. Ill

473,

#

,

344.

1S3 See,

e_;_g.,

Comm.

01/04/1957, Bull. Civ. Ill,

154 See, e.g.. Civ. 05/04/1966, Bull. Civ. I,
Comm. 12/14/1970, Bull. Civ. IV, # 345.

#

#

271.

6.
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12) The statutory consumers

1

protection against warranty

disclaimers
The Act of 01/10/1978 on consumers' information and

protection, the so-called "Scrivener Act" aims to shield

against clauses imposed upon consumers or non-professional
by an abuse of bargaining power superiority of professional
sellers.
A Decree of 03/24/1978 X55 has been passed to enforce

the "Scrivener Act". In particular, Article

2

of the Decree

provides that "any clause whose object or effect is to
delete or reduce non-professional or consumers remedy
rights in case of breach of any seller's obligations" is

abusive according to the "Scrivener Act."

Obviously the

seller's warranty obligations are directly concerned and
one can see through that Decree's provision a legislative

consecratrion of the hidden defect warranty case law.
The french legislator's goal is clearly to avoid express

warranties that may circumvent the legal protection auto-

matically secured to consumers.

That is why Article

4

of

the Decree requires that contracts which contain an

express warranty stipulation must mention that "in any case
the legal warranty which compels the professional seller to

guarantee the buyer against any hidden defects of the thing
sold will be given effect."

155 Decree

#

78-464 (03/24/1978).
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2)

Exception

:

Validity of warranty-limiting clauses in

contracts between professional of the same expertise

To the extent that it is normal to protect naive

purchasers against the danger of defective products, it
seems equally to be fair to let a professional buyer, aware
of the inherent defects of certain goods, evaluate the

injurious consequences of hidden defects if he is willing
to accept a contract containing warranty-limiting clauses.

Where contracting parties are experienced professionals,
the french case law has acknowledged the validity of

warranty-limiting clauses (21) but, at the same time,
restricting the impact of such an exception (22).
21) The scope of application of the exception

By two decisions of 10/30/1978 and 11/06/1978 1SS , the

French Supreme Court set forth, as matter of principle,
that warranty disclaimers issued by professional sellers

may be given effect if the seller and the purchaser were of
comparable experience and expertise.

However, neither of

those decisions, though they stated the validity of

warranty disclaimers where seller and buyer were doing
business in the same special field, enforced the warrantylimiting clauses.

1,56

Comm. 10/30/1978 & 11/06/1978, R.T.D. Civ. 1979 , 392;
J. C. P. 1979. II. 19178.

68

In the 10/30/1978 judgment, the Supreme Court refused
to take into account the litigated clause because the

invoked hidden defect was particularly difficult to find
out: according to the Court's reasoning, the defect was "so

well hidden" that it prevented the warranty disclaimer from

being given effect.

This argument which seems to equate

the notion of hidden defect warranty with the possibility
of disclaiming the legal warranty is debatable.

In the 11/06/1978 decision, the warranty-limiting

clause was dismissed because the buyer, though professional
and acting as such, was a "client-user" and did not have
the same expertise as the seller. 15

"

7

The Supreme Court's

reluctance to enforce the foregoing disclaimers leads one
to wonder whether there may be concrete situation in which

warranty disclaimers will be given effect.
22) The impact of the exception

One may legitimately doubt that the concept of pro-

fessionals of the same speciality, as restrictive as it is
so far construed by courts, gives firm ground for sellers

to ecape their warranty liability through disclaimers.

Indeed judicial precedents have rather pointed out illustrations where the disclaimers' validity between certain

professionals is reaffirmed as matter of principle but not

In this case, the buyer was an excavating
contractor who purchased a mechanical digger from the
seller
"

tL5 7
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enforced. X5S

The issue lies on the understanding of the

notion of professionals of comparable expertise. One could
have thought that an excavating contractor had particular

knowledges about mechanical digger 159 which should have
allowed the upholding of the disclaimer.

The Supreme

Court, in that case, was much more exacting.

First,

however important an excavating contractor's expertise

may-

be as to materials used in his trade, he is not deemed a

professional of the same special field as his vendor.
Identity of trade speciality should consequently be

restricted to consecutive professional sellers of
product.

a same

This latter argument is sustained by the Supreme

Court's reference to the notion of "client-user".
Thus, the decisive test should not be the comparable

expertise as to certain goods but rather the buyer's
situation in the chain of distribution: the "client-user"
is assimilated to a consumer who purchases goods with the

intent to use, either commercially or privately, but with
no intent to resell. The "client-user" is distinguished

from the professional who buys products in order to resell

with or without product's modification.
Surprisingly, however great his expertise might be,
the "client-user" will be protected like an ordinary

Comm.

158 See,

e^.,

15 *See,

Comm.

Comm. 04/18/1980, Bull. Civ. IV,
Civ. IV, # 365.
Bull.
11/04/1980,

11/06/1978, supra note 156.

#
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CHAPTER III.

REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY

Whenever a consumer purchases an automobile,

a

refrigerator or a stereo that turns out to be defective, he
is primarily concerned with the possible means of allowing

him to get

a

product suitable for his desires.

If an altimeter breaks down and causes an airplane's

crash and numerous passsengers' death, the greatest

preoccupation is suddenly shifted to the allowance of
damages.

These two examples highlight the two categories of
remedies a breach of warranty may trigger, namely the
remedies as to the goods themselves

(A)

and as to the award

of damages (B)

A)

AS TO THE DEFECTIVE GOODS
It seems here appropriate to distinguish express

remedies
a)

(a)

from legal ones (b)

Express Remedies
Under both America and French systems, the freedom

of contract enables contracting parties to include remedies

appropriate to their particular needs in their agreement.
In both commercial and consumers sales, most warrantors

will provide specific remedies to cure a defect's occurence
71

72

(1).

But, at the same time, sellers in fact will combine

express remedies with a limitation of their liability

rendering necessary a due care from the legislative body
(2).

1

)

Catalogue of express remedies
Most vendors or manufacturers expressly guarantee

that the product sold, if the case arises, will be made to

conform to what the buyer contracted for. This explains why
a

warranty of repair or replacement of defective parts

clause is so widespread in contract of sales. There are as

many different warranty of repair and replacement
stipulations as there are different warrantor's wishes:
some intend to repair only, 152 some others provide an

option, at the warrantor's election, between repairing or

replacing. 153

.

Likewise, some warranties will leave

162 "Chevrolet (Chevrolet Motor Division, General
motors Corporation) warrants to the owner of each 1973
model Nova and Vega motor vehicle that for a period of 12
months or 12,000 miles, whichever first occurs, it will
repair any defective or malfunctioning part of the
vehicle-except tires which are warranted seperately by
the tire manufacturer. This warranty covers only repairs
made necessary due to defects in material or workmanship."

The above mentioned clause has been debated in
Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 3 96
N.E.2d 761,27 U.C.C. Rep.Serv, 973 (1979).
1S3 "International Harvester Company warrants to the
original purchaser each item of new farm and industrial
equipment to be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service. The obligation of the
Company under this warranty is limited to repairing and
replacing, as to the Company may elect, free of charge
for installation, at the palce of business of a dealer

73

labour's costs to the purchaser whereas some other will
not. 154

Generally speaking, any warranty of repair or

replacement purports to give the buyer the assurance of
freedom from defects in material and workmanship.
The refund of purchase price warranty is also a very

common formal express warranty where repair or replacement

may not be the appropriate solution. 155
consumer goods is involved

Indeed where a

it may be adequate for the

unsatisfied buyer to get the return of the purchase price.
In commercial transactions, however, the economic loss

resulting from a defective goods may by far exceed the
of a Company authorized to handle the equipment covered
by this warranty, any parts that prove, in the Company's
judgment, to be defective in material or wormanship
within twelve months or 1500 hours of use, whichever
occurs first, after delivery to the original purchaser."

This clause has been litigated in Clark v.
International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P. 2d 784, 25
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 91 (1978).
164 "Your franchise Saab dealer will repair or replace
defective parts at no charge for parts and labor, provided,
however, that it is notified of the defect within the above

stated warranty period."
This is part of a warranty clause which has been
discussed in Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d
349,

22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
163,12.00%

945

(Minn.

1979).

GROWER GUARANTEED Satisfaction guaranteed or

the purchase price of this product will be refunded

immediately by KALO Laboratories, Inc. Manufacturer's
liability is limited to this refund."
This provision has been litigated in Majors v. Kalo
Laboratories, Inc., 407 F.Supp. 20, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
592 (M.D.Ala. 1975).
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price of that goods. This is why most warranties, if not
all, limit remedies available to the return of the price or

the repair or replacement of defective parts.

Accordingly it is logical to determine to which
extent remedy limitations will be given effect if they are

challenged in courts.

Validity of limited express remedies

2)

The French position towards such limitations is

drastic (21) whereas the America one, though stringent,
leaves some room to ingenious warranty drafters to

efficiently restrict remedies provided to repair,
replacement or refund of the price (22).
21

)

Strict invalidity of limited remedies under the French
law

The clauses stating that the seller's liability is

"expressly limited to repair of defective parts" X6S or
only consists "in supplying replacement parts to the

exclusion of labor and shipment's costs" 15 7 are definitely
"

void. One may here recall the general principle under which

remedy limitations are strictly equated with warranty

x66 See, e^g., Comm.

Civ.

#

381

233,

197

07/17/1964, Bull. Civ. Ill,
03/27/1969, D.1969, 635.
XG7 See, e.q.

f

,

Comm. 10/17/1977, Bull. Civ.,

#

disclaimers by the French case law

and consequently are

not enforceable. lsa

Given that, those very frequent above-mentioned

clauses which are legally of no effect will practically
achieve their purpose whenever consumers are concerned.

Indeed only few of them, if any, are aware of that case law
and will go before courts to enforce their rights. In that
context, the Decree of 03/24/1978 which requires mention of
the legal warranty existence may have been a step towards a

greater efficiency of consumers protection.
'

Though,

especially for worthless items, consumers will still
hesitate to bring a suit.
22

)

Potential validity of limited remedies under the
America law

Generally speaking, the U.C.C. allows the seller not
only to disclaim warranties 159 but also to limit and even
exclude remedies afforded to the buyer in case of breach of
the warranty. One may, by the way, raise the interesting

question as to whether there is any difference in terms of
effect between warranty disclaimers and remedy exclusions.
Indeed where a seller extends no remedy at all for defects
in specified parts, he makes no warranty as to these parts.
168 For a general discussion on warranty disclaimers
under the French law, See Ch.II) B) b) supra.
XS9 For a general discussion on warranty disclaimers
under the American law, See Ch.II) B) a) supra.
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Consequently, by eliminating certain remedies, can

a

sly

warranty drafter be able to circumvent all the warranty
disclaimers requirements as set forth in

S.

2-316? The

answer, as we will see, is negative. Whenever a seller

restricts his liability by providing some specific remedies
and thus excluding some others, S. 2-719(1)

&

(2)

xvo will

come into play and impose requirements on such a limitation
of remedy to be given effect. The remedy provided in the

express warranty must be understood as the exclusive remedy
for breach of warranty (221) and not be so inadequate that

"circumstances cause it to fail of its essential purpose"
(222)

221

Requirement of

)

Under

X_7

X 7X
~

Comment

2

S.

2-719

(

a

language of exclusiveness

1) (b)

as supplemented by its Official

there is a presumption that express and legal

°S. 2-719 provides:

(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of
this section and of the preceding section on liquidation
and limitation of damages, (a) the agreement may provide
for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those
provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure
of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting
the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment
of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming
goods or parts; and (b) resort to a remedy as provided is
optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be
exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where
circumstances cause an exclusive or limited to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
Act.
x_7X

0f f icial Comment 2, S. 2-719 indicates:
Subsection (l)(b) creates a presumption that clauses
prescribing remedies are cumulative rather than exclusive.
If the parties intend the term to describe the sole remedy
"

7*7

remedies are cumulative. Thus if the warranty is not

carefully drafted and does not express some unambiguous
intent to make a remedy exclusive by using words like
"only", "sole" or the like, the aggrieved buyer will be

free to seek any additional remedy not mentioned in the
1 72
"

contract.

Courts have large discretion when evaluating

words of exclusivity. When the buyer is a consumer, the
court will scrutinize the contract language and may set
aside the apparent intent of the draftsman as to the

remedy's exclusiveness

:

a statement that

warranty of repair

or replacement is "expressly in lieu of all other

warranties or obligations" has been struck down as nonexclusive in consumer cases. 173
222)

Possible failure of an exclusive remedy of its

essential purpose

Assuming the existence of an exclusive remedy as
above defined, the inguiry then becomes whether "an

under the contract, this must be clearly expressed."
1 72
"

Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176,
See, e.g
since remedy of repair or replacement
465 S.W.2d. (1971)
of defective parts was nowhere expressly stated to be
exclusive remedy, purchaser of an automobile which caught
fire in garage and burn down house could recover damages of
$ 89.279 for loss of car and house); Herbstman v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super 439, 330 A. 2d 384 (1974)
(warranty provision stating "We will repair your camera at
no charge within one year after purchase" does not oprate
to exclude all other remedies, and plaintiff was entitled
to alternative of cash refund)
.

,

(

x "73

Misc. 2d.

See

,

99,

e.g

.

,

Stream

397 N.Y.S.2d.

v.

Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 91

677

(1977).
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exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose" and if it
does, the buyer will be able to invoke all remedies allowed

by the Code.

1 74
'

Two issues have to be addressed: What is

an essential purpose?

(2221)

and when does an exclusive

remedy fail of its essential purpose (2222)?
2221)

What is an essential purpose?
To what extent can an exclusive remedy of repair or

replacement fall short of its essential purpose? In Beal
„.

General Motors Corp.,

1 75
"

the court explains that an

essential purpose "is to give the seller an opportunity to
make the goods conforming while limiting the risks to which
he is subject by excluding direct and consequential damages
that might otherwise arise. From the point of view of the

buyer the purpose of the exclusive remedy is to give him
goods that conform to the contract within a reasonable
time after a defective part is discovered. Similarly, the

essential purpose of a refund of price warranty is, for
the purchaser, to restore the warranted value of the goods

while, for the seller, disallowing any further liability.
In sum, from the buyer's standpoint, which is here

primarily relevant, the essential purpose of a limited

174 S. 2-719(2)
175 354 F.Supp.
(D.Del. 1973).

423,

426,

12 U.C.C.Rjp.

105,

109
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remedy is to secure the value of his disappointing
bargain. 1VS
2222) When does a limited remedy fail of its essential

purpose?
Courts have found a warranty of repair or replacement
to fail its essential purpose where a product has a latent

defect, not discoverable within the time limitation of the

warranty,

1 "7

'

7
,

when the warrantor fails to correct the

defect within a reasonable time 1

"

73

and when the seller is

unable to cure the nonconformity of the goods.

1 79
"

Similarly, a refund of the price limitation fails of its

essential purpose where the warrantor refuses to provide
the refund after the breach or as in Neville Chemical Co.
v.

Union Carbide Corporation, 180 where the buyer incurs

large losses due to a latent product defect.
1 7S
"

0fficial Comment

1,

S.

2-719 expressly states:

"... .where an apparent fair and reasonable clause because
of the circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to
deprive either party of the substantial value of the
bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions
of this Article."

177 See , e.g

.

Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d.

,

Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson,
244 N.E.2d. 685 (1968).

398,

1 7B
"

Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. James W. Laird,
See e.g
432 So. 2D 1259, 36 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 437 (Ala. 1983).
,

.

,

1 79
~

See, e.g , Osburn v. Bendix Home Sys , Inc.
445, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 119 (Okla. 1980).
.

.

P. 2d.

613

1B °294 F.Supp. 649, 5 U. C. C. Rep. Serv. 1219 (D.Pa.
1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 422 F.2d. 1205,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 81 (3rd Circ.1970).
,

30

One may infer, from the case law dealing with the

"failure of essential purpose" issue, two categories of

situations in which courts are willing to strike down a
remedy limitation because of failure if its essential
purpose:
First, where the seller does not provide the promised

limited remedy. In this case, it is simply a failure of a
general duty to fulfill any contract obligation, here an

obligation to repair or replace or refund the price. There
is accordingly no need to refer to a failure of limited

remedy's essential purpose when it is obviously a breach of
a

contract obligation.
Second, where there is a latent defect undiscoverable

within the warranty period and/or causing large losses. In
this hypothesis, it rather involves unconscionability

considerations. Indeed, in the Neville case, the court

discussing the price refund limitation stated that "such
limitation on time and damages, when the defect is latent,
are illusory and under the circumstances of this case

represent no remedy at all." XBX
Stating that a remedy is "illusory" is very much like

deeming the remedy limitation unconscionable. There is no
doubt that, through

S.

2-719 and its Official Comment

1B1 294 F.Supp. at 655,
ia2 S. 2-719

5

1,

1B2

U.C.C. Rep.Serv. at 1224.

expressly authorizes courts to set aside
unconscionable conseguential damages limitations or
exclusions
(

3

)

81

the U.C.C. drafters intended to avoid unconscionable

consequences of limitation of remedy. That is why it is
very well arguable not to give effect to a limiting remedy
clause because of its unconscionability but at the same
time it clearly raises the question of a real ground of

existence for the "failure of essential purpose" notion or
rather to which extent this notion might be different from
the unconscionability concept.
b)

Legal Remedies
The contemplated issue over the following develop-

ments is whether there is any provision under both America
and French related pieces of legislations that allows the

contract's rescission and consequently the recovery of the

purchase price for the buyer and the return of the
defective goods for the seller. If the answer is
unambiguous under the French law which specifically
authorizes the contract's rescission for breach of

warranty against hidden defects (1), the solution given by
the America law is not as clear

:

the revocation of

acceptance followed by the contract's cancellation being
the sole and debatable way out (2).

Official Comment 1, S. 2-719 states "there must be at
least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract."
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1)

The Article 1644 XB3 of the Civ.C. or a provision to get
the contract's rescission

Under Art. 1644, the purchaser is given the

possibility to get the resolution of the sale, the socalled "redhibitory action", on account of hidden defects
in the goods. The buyer must then give back the thing in

the same condition as it was delivered. The seller is to

return the purchase price and the expenses connected with
the sale. By costs occasioned by the sale, one may include

all the expenses incurred in seeking the contract's

rescission: among others the travelling costs due to the
trial XS4 and the expert's fees for the ascertainment of the
defect. 185

As to attorney fees, they may be recoverable

under the general related provision of the New Civil

Procedure Code. 136

The purchase price is to be

supplemented by interests accrued from the time of the sale
up to the restoration. 1S

'

7

XS3 Article 1644 provides:
"In the cases specified by
buyer
may elect to return the
the
articles 1641 and 1643,
or
to
keep the thing and
thing and recover the price,
price,
as determined by
of
the
obtain a return of part

experts.
XS4 See, e.g., Req.

04/26/1870, D.1871, 11.

ia5 See, e.g

01/04/1965, D.1965, Somm.78.

.

,

Civ.

:Lse

New Civil Procedure Code, Article 700 provides:
"Where it appears inequitable to burden one party with sums
expended by him and not included in the costs, the judge
may order the other party to pay him such an amount as he
determines
.

187 See, e.g.

,

Comm.

06/25/1980, D.1981, I.R. 40.

33

Still under Art. 1644, the disappointed buyer may

alternatively elect to keep the goods and get back part of
the price: this is the so-called "estimatory action". It

necessarily implies that the defect does not render the
goods' use absolutely impossible but only inconvenient or

imperfect. This cutting-back of the initial price

theoretically is what the buyer would not have

given if he

had known of the vice

Legally speaking, the "estimatory action" does not
entitle the buyer to get the defective product fixed. 188

Practically speaking the "estimatory action" is very rare.
The explanation is simple as much as logical: if a product
is defective it may contain either material or minor

defects. In the former case, the purchaser is likely to
seek to get the contract's rescission because the goods are
not worth keeping.

In the latter assumption, there is a

good deal of chance that courts deem the defect not to be

hidden or sufficiently grave according to Article 1641 and
its case law construction. 139

188 See, e.g.. Civ.
1B9 See,

e^.,

Comm.

03/15/1948.

D.1948, 346.

07/01/1980, Bull Civ. Ill
.

,

#

131
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The U.C.C.

2)

S.

2-608 190 or a way to get around the

absence of of a specific provision to obtain the

contract's rescission
The issue to deal with is whether there is any

possibility to recover the price of a defective product in
the absence of an express warranty providing such a remedy.

The ratio decidendi laid down by the recent judicial

pronouncements indicate that the aggrieved buyers were
allowed to get the refund of the purchase price on the
basis of

S. 2-608,

namely, the revocation of acceptance

(21). Legally speaking some of these decisions are

debatable
21

)

(

22)

Cases supporting the revocation of acceptance theory
Cases authorizing the unfortunate buyer to revoke his

acceptance are to be divided into two categories:

On the

one hand, there are some cases in which the seller

provides a limited warranty to repair or to replace and

19 °S.

608 provides in part:
The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or
commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs
its value to him if he has accepted it (a) on the
reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be
cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or (b) without
discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within reasonable
time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered
the ground for it.
(1)

2

-
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subsequently breaches his warranty by refusal to repair or
an unsuccessful repair. Courts then deemed revocation of

acceptance following such a breach to be an available
remedy. 191

Upon cancellation 192 the buyer is entitled to the

return of the purchase price. In order to trigger

S.

2-608

the buyer is required to prove a non-conformity not within

his knowledge at the time of acceptance and substantially

impairing the goods' value to him. The buyer must revoke
his acceptance within a reasonable time.

Easiness of

detecting non-conformity may be an hurdle to rightfully
revoke acceptance. 193

Substantial impairment may be

appraised according to the buyers' particular needs and the

circumstances of the case. 194

The reasonable time to

revoke acceptance may be extended whenever the seller

unsuccessfully attempted to cure the defective goods.
On the other hand, there are some other cases in

which the seller disclaimed all warranties and only passed
191 See

,

125 GA. App.

e .g

.

,

Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
188 SE 2d 250

462,

(1972).

192 S. 2-711 allows the buyer after a proper revocation
to get the contract cancelled.
193 See, e.g
Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Clarence R.
Miller 420 Mich. 452, 362 N.W 2d 704 (Mich. 1984) Di
Domenico Packaging Corp. v. Nails Again, Inc. 139 Misc. 2d
525, 527 N.Y.S.2d 676 (N.Y. City Civ.Ct. 1988).
.

,

194 See, Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Clarence R. Miller's
case, note 193/ supra.
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the manufacturer's written warranty. The product sold

turned out to be defective right after the delivery. Some
courts have held that revocation of acceptance is an

available remedy even where the seller has attempted to
limit his warranties and have stated that the U.C.C.

provides a general remedy besides any warranty. 195
This latter consideration in particular leads to

further critical comments.
22)

The revocation of acceptance theory or
a disputable device to bring into play

The problem here to be debated is whether revocation
of acceptance is an appropriate remedy to use in situations

involving defective products and consequently breach of
warranty.
First, one should recall that revocation of

acceptance is for the judicial redressal of non-conforming
goods regardless of any defect which may have existed in

Non-conformity is to be primarily viewed

the product sold.

as a question of quantity and quality of goods: did the

buyer receive exactly what the contract between the parties
It seems that courts have equated

described?

19S See

non-

Hub Motor Co. v. Zurawski, 157 GA. App.
e.g
689
(1981); Esquire Mobile Homes, Inc. v.
850, 278 SE 2d
App.
528, 356 SE 2d 250 (1987); Advanced
GA.
Arrendale, 182
186 GA. App. 10, 366 SE 2d 303
Sizemore,
Computer Sales v.
(1988)

.

,

.

,
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conformity with defectiveness by authorizing revocation of
acceptance in cases dealing with defective goods.
Second, in deciding to allow revocation of acceptance

where there have been valid warranty limitations, courts
have either declared

S.

2-608 a general ever available

remedy or deemed exclusion of warranties to be
unconscionable.

Both these holdings are disputable.

To state S. 2- 608 as an available remedy, even where
the seller has attempted to limit his warranty obligations,
is no less than to totally undermine seller's intent to

restrict his liability which is expressly permitted by

S.

2-719.

Likewise, to allow revocation of acceptance to come
into play because of the warranty exclusion's

unconscionability is first to admit that an otherwise valid
exclusion of warranty may be unconscionable X9S

Even

assuming that a warranty disclaimer could be
unconscionable, it might only be so under

S.

2-302 which

expressly refers to the time of the contract making to
determine the unconscionability of the clause in a
contract. In Freeman v. Hubco Leasing 197 and in Esguire

Mobile Home Inc. v. Arrendale 193 sellers actually took no
196 For a discussion on this particular issue,
See Ch.II) B) a) 113) supra.
L9T 253 Ga.

"

App.

698,

324 S.E.2d 462

X9S See note 194/ supra.

(1985).
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warranty responsibilities and there were only remedies
against the manufacturer who subsequently went out of
business. At the time of the contract, the exclusion of

warranty provision was not unconscionable for the buyer was
given remedies against the manufacturer.
As a matter of conclusion on that debatable issue,

one should add that most of the cases above cited were

consumer cases where the attendant circumstances deprived
the purchaser of any remedy.

This latter consideration

might have led courts to a certain leniency towards
plaintiffs.
B)

AS TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES

Because of the proximity between non-conformity and

warranty of quality obligations under both systems, it may
be useful to underscore that the following discussion will
be based on the assumption that the buyer has accepted the
goods, let reasonable time to revoke his acceptance go by,

discovered the defect and is now seeking damages for breach
of warranty. Both America and French law guarantee the

aggrieved buyer rights to damages but differ as to the
means to get them.

Whereas the U.C.C. itself provides an elaborate set
of rules dealing with damages'

award (a), the Civ.C.

related provision has been superseded by courts

construction (b).

1
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a)

The Elaborate Regime of Damages under the U.C.C.
The disappointed buyer who has overcome all the

previous hurdles erected in his way will be awarded damages

which under the U.C.C. relevant provisions, are classified
(1)

and may be limited (2).

I

The U.C.C. damages classification
At the heart of the classification lies a fundamental

distinction between, on the one hand, direct damages to the
extent the goods are worth less than they were warranted to
be (11) and, on the other hand, indirect damages as a

result of the breach of warranty under the circumstances

contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was
entered into (12).
II)

General, direct or primary damages
S.

(

S.

2-714)

x

"

2-714 (2) specifically sets forth the damages for

breach of warranty as "the difference at the time and place
of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and

199 S.

2-714 provides:
"When the buyer has accepted goods and given
notification [Sub. (3) S. 2-607] he may recover as damages
for any non-conformity of tender of the loss resulting in
the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as
determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had if they had been as warranted, unless special
circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and conseguential
damages under the next section may also be recovered."
(1)

90

the value they would have had if they had been as warranted

unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a

different amount"

Accordingly we have to separate the general way of

measuring general damages (111) from the measure of general
damages under special circumstances (112).
Ill

)

The basic measure of general damages

From the letter of

S.

2-714 (2) it is suggested that

the common measure of general damages is reflected by the

diminution in value of the goods caused by the breach of
warranty. Courts are inclined to state that the cost of

repair provides the most objective measure of the

difference in the value of the goods as warranted and as
received whenever a reasonable expenditure will bring the
goods into conformity with their warranties. 200

This

latter precision leaves the door open to another scheme to

measure primary damages when repair of the goods is
impossible or inappropriate. In that case, damages will be

awarded on the basis of the difference between the value of
the goods as warranted, which may be either the purchase

price 201 or the fair market value at the time
200 See, e.g Tarter v. Monark Boat Co., 430 F.Supp.
1290 (ED Mo. 19770, 22 U.C.C.Rep. 33, aff'd, 574 F2d 984
(8th Cir.1978); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker
Corp., 428 F.Supp. 364 (ED Mich. 1977), 21 U C C.Rep. 80
,

.

20:L

.

McGrady v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 46
See, e.g
Ill.App. 3d 136, 360 N.E.2d 818, 21 U.C.C. Rep. 532 (1977);
Inc. v Ace
Louis DeGidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales & Serv.
.

,

,
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acceptance, 202 and the value of the goods as accepted,

which may be the price received on resale 203 or the market
price of the goods as accepted if no resale is held. 204
Still under

S.

2-714(2), general damages calculation
'

is to be based upon a different standard where "special

circumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount

.

The measure of general damages under special

112)

circumstances
Special circumstances may lead to recover direct

damages of a different amount from what "the difference in
value" standard would have determined.

This means that

under special circumstances direct damages may be either

bigger or on the contrary smaller than under normal

circumstances
On the former assumption, it seems that courts have

primarily used special circumstances to award, in addition
Eng'r Co., 302 Minn. 19, 225 N.W.2d 217, 15 U.C.C.Rep. 801
(1974)
202 See, e.g , Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547
F.2D 1365, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 1181 (8th Cir. 1977); Neuman v.
Spector Wrecking & Salvage Co., 490 S.W.2d 875, 12 U.C.C.
Rep. 254 (Tex.Ct.App. 1973).
.

2°3

Bergenstock v. Lemay's GMC, Inc., 372
See, e.g
A2d 69 (RI 1977), 22 U.C.C. Rep. 958; ITT-Industrial Credit
Co. v. Milo Concrete Co. 229 SE2d 814 (NC Ct.App. 1976), 20
U.C.C. Rep. 1067.
.

,

204 See, e.g
Simmons v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc.
290 SE2d 710 (NC Ct.App. 1982), 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1339.
.

,
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to primary damages, consequential and incidental

damages. 205

since

S.

Such

construction of

a

S.

2-714(2) is needless

2-714(3) itself allows "in a proper case" to obtain

incidental and consequential damages.
In the latter assumption, courts have rightfully

invoked special circumstances to lower damages in order to
avoid what appeared to be a windfall in favor of the buyer.

Two illustrations may be given: first, when the repairs
make the goods superior to what they would have been as

This may happen in case of a breach of warranty

warranted.

which occurs long after the delivery and thus implies a
significant buyer's prior use. 206

Second, when the

subjective loss, namely the loss of a particular buyer, is

different and by assumption lesser than the objective loss,
namely the loss of a general class of buyer. This is the
case when the goods' ultimate value to the particular buyer
is greater than their objective market value at the time of

acceptance

2 °"7
.

2Q5 See

e.g , Prutch v. Ford Motor Co., 574 P. 2d 102,
Colo. Ct App. 1977); Murray v. Kleen
Rep. 637
Leen, Inc., 354 N.E.2d 415 (111. App.Ct. 1976), 20 U.C.C.
298.
,

.

23 U.C.C.

20S See, e.g

(

.

Community Television Servs. Inc. v.
Dresser Indus., 435 F.Supp. 214 (DSD 1977), 12 U.C.C. Rep.
.

,

686.
2 °"7

See, e.g , Vorthman v. Keith E. Meyers Entreprises,
296 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1980), 30 U.C.C. Rep. 924.
.
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Actually, one may doubt from the foregoing discussion
of the real usefulness of the "special circumstances"

exception which appears to be either superfluous or of a
little practical importance.
12)

Special, indirect or resultant damages
As S. 2-715 suggests, we have to distinguish

incidental damages (121) from consequential damages (122).
As we will see, to accurately allocate indirect damages

among the two above-mentioned categories may be of a

certain significance.
121)

Incidental damages

(

S

.

2-715

(

1 ))

20B

As to their nature, incidental damages are very much

like expenses connected to the sale under Civ.C. Art.
1646 209 in the sense that they encompass any reasonable

expenses incidental to the breach of warranty like charges
for the inspection that revealed the defect's nature or

transportation costs incurred by the buyer in connection
with the sale.

However, emphasizing our hypothetical

situation under which the buyer has retained the defective
20S S.

2-715(1) provides:
"Incidental damages resulting from the seller, s breach
include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection,
receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods
rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover
and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or
other breach."
209 See

Ch.III) A) b)

1)

supra.
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goods, there is a threshold problem to be solved as to

whether

S.

2-715(1) incidental damages are available where

the buyer has accepted the goods.

and its Official Comment

i

2rLO

Indeed

S.

2-715(1) itself

do stress the fact that

incidental damages are usually linked to goods "rightfully
rejected" or connected with "effecting cover."

Although eminent authorities 211 deny the buyer's
right to get incidental damages when he retains the goods,

both judicial precedents and textual argument may support
the opposite view.
At least two cases have awarded incidental damages

where the buyer had kept defective goods. 212

persuasive is

S.

Even more

2-714(3) itself which, dealing with

"buyer's damages for breach in regards to accepted goods",

expressly refers to incidental damages as being
recoverable.
21o 0fficial Comment 1, S. 2-715(1) states:
"Subsection (1) is intended for the buyer who incurs
reasonable expenses in connection with the handling of

rightfully rejected goods whose acceptance may be
justifiably revoked, or in connection with effecting cover
where the breach of the contract lies in non-conformity or
non-delivery of the goods. The incidental damages listed
are not intended to be exhaustive but merely illustrative
of the typical kinds of incidental damage."
211 See "Article Two: Warranties in commercial
transactions" 64 Cornell L.Rev. 30, 115-116 (1978).
212 See, Safeway Stores, Inc. v. L.D. Schreiber Cheese
Co., 326 F.Supp. 504 (WD Mo. 1971), 9 U.C.C. Rep. 407; Lewis
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F2d 500 (8th Cir.1971), 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 625.

05

122^

Consequential damages

(

S

.

2-715

(

2

2:L3
)

)

Practically speaking, consequential damages suits

undoubtedly are "big money" suits. Legally speaking,
consequential damages probably are one of the hottest and
most litigated issues as to their content as much as to
their possible limitations. 214

S.

2-715(2) clearly

indicates the width of such a notion by stating that it

might include "any loss" resulting from the seller's breach
of warranty as well as property damage and personal injury.

However, at the same time, S. 2-715

(2)

sets up limits as to

the recoverability of consequential damages.

Not only the

plaintiff has to prove the breach and the injury caused

thereby but also that the injury could have been

contemplated by the seller and was unavoidable.
the

f oreseeability

This is

test and the mitigation duty that the

buyer has to satisfy under

S.

2-715 2) 215
(

In addition,

213 S. 2-715(2) provides:

"Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of
contracting had reason to know and which could not
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty."
214 For a general discussion on limitation of damages,
See Ch.III) B) a) 2) infra.
215 The

f oreseeability test is expressed in the
seller's "reason to know" that the breach of warranty will
cause damage.
The buyer's mitigation duty is embodied by the sole
recovery of loss "which could not reasonably be prevented
by cover or otherwise"
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there must be some tangible basis for calculating these

damages: this is the certainty reguirement. Lost profits,

which are by far the most important categories of
conseguential economic damages, have to be proved with a
reasonable certainty.

That is why courts are reluctant to

award damages in the form of lost profits to a new business
entreprise.

Plaintiff in such a situation will have a

difficult burden of proof. 215
A guirk has here to be underlined: under the so-

called "American rule", attorney fees, which seem by nature
to comply with the conseguential damages definition, are
'

not recoverable absent an express contractual or statutory

provision. 2X

"

7

As a matter of conclusion on indirect damages, we may

underline the potential interests of the dichotomy between
incidental and conseguential damages. First, the recovery
of conseguential damages is more severely ruled. The
f oreseeability

and mitigation hurdles are much more

difficult to overcome than the reasonableness test applied
for incidental damages recovery.

23 s

See e.g ., El Fredo Pizza, Inc. v. Roto-Flex Oven
300 N.W.2d 358 (Neb. 1978), 23 U.C.C. Rep. 342.
,

Co.,

2:L "7

Under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 USC
courts may allow the recovery of attorney
2)
fees in consumers sales 'cases.

S. 2310(d)

(

,
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Second, and even more significant, whereas it is

common to contractually exclude consequential damages from
recovery, it is fairly rare that sellers take pain to push

aside their liability for incidental damages as well. By so
doing, they take the chance that courts will broaden the

incidental damages' notion so that they award money danages
for what should have been deemed consequential damages and

consequently excluded from recovery. 213
2

)

Limitation of damages under the U.C.C.
The issue here to be debated is whether primary or

resultant damages may efficiently be limited or excluded.
The answer is definitely positive provided that the

limitation or exclusion is not unconscionable. The U.C.C.
has two separate provisions that may be invoked to declare

damages limitation or exclusion unconscionable and thus of
'

no effect. 219

The relevant question is then to determine

to what extent unconscionability may defeat

primary (21)

and consequential (22) damages' limitations.

2rLa

See e.g ., McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co., 645
P2d 543 (Ore.Ct.App. 1982), 33 U.C.C. Rep. 1315; Council
Brothers, Inc. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F2d 400 (5th 1973),
11 U.C.C. Rep. 1126.
,

2X9 S. 2-302

and S. 2-719(3)

.
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21)

Primary damages

1

limitation

The general unconscionability provision, S. 2-302, may

apply to all contracts and consequently be used against

primary damages' limitation or exclusion. In that event,
the clause's unconscionability is to be tested at the time
of the making of the contract. In addition, Official

Comment

1

S.

2-719 states in part that "any clause

purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of
Article

2

in an unconscionable manner is subject to

deletion and in that event the Code remedies are applicable
as if the stricken clause had never existed."

In other words, a clause that does not provide a fair

quantum of remedy fails the Code's test of conscionability
As indicated earlier, 220 S. 2-719 (2) assumes the fairness
of the remedy limiting clause at the time of the making of

the contract, which clause may become unfair due to later

circumstances under the "failure of essential purpose"
test.

Taking into account the foregoing considerations, we
can first say that limitation as opposed to exclusion of

primary damages is prima facie conscionable. Second, if a

primary damages limitation clause is to be challenged
'

because of circumstances subsequent the making of the
contract, the "failure of essential purpose" test should
come into play and not the unconscionability theory, which
'See Ch.III)

A)

a)

22)

supra.
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should only be contemplated at the time of the conclusion
of the contract. However, as we have seen, 221 the "failure
of essential purpose" test is often equated by courts with
a

post-contract unconscionability test.

22)

Consequential damages

1

Unconscionability under

limitation
S.

(

S

.

2-719

(

3

222
)

2-719(3) is emphasized as

the primary test of validity for clauses limiting or

excluding consequential damages. With respect to the burden
of proof and the likelihood to get such clauses declared

unconscionable, it appears relevant to separate commercial
(221)

from consumers' transactions (222).

221)

In commercial transactions

The U.C.C. drafters, through S. 2-719(3) and its

Official Comment

3,

223 specifically provide that

limitation of liability for consequential losses in a

commercial case is not prima facie unconscionable.
221 See

Ch.III) A) a) 2222) supra.

222 S. 2-719(3) provides:

"Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limtation of
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."
223 0fficial Comment 3, S. 2-719 states:
"Subsection (3) recognizes the validity of clauses limiting
or excluding consequential damages but makes it clear that
they may not operate in an unconcionable manner. Actually
such terms are merely an allocation of unknown or
underteminablr risks. The seller in all cases is free to
disclaim warranties in the manner provided in Section

2-316."

100

Accordingly, most assertions of unconscionability of

consequential damages

1

limitation or exclusion in

commercial transactions have met with a refusal. 224
However, there are three kinds of situations in which

exceptions will be preferred to the general foregoing rule.
First, where personal injury has occured, courts are likely

not to uphold consequential damages limitations. 225
'

Second, exactly as French courts, which strike down

warranty-limiting clause in case of a "too well hidden
defect, n22S some America courts refused to enforce

consequential damages limitation where latent or
'

undiscoverable defects were encountered. 22 7
"

Third, where

circumstances caused a remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, some courts have denied any effect to a coupled

clause excluding consequential damages. 223
224 See, e.g , Argo Welded Prods, v. J.T. Ryerson Steel
& Sons, Inc., 528 F.Supp. 583 (ED Pa. 1981), 33
U.C.C. Rep. 1349; Jonhson v. John Deere Co., 306 NW2d 231
(SD 1981), 31 U.C.C. Rep. 992.
.

22S See, e.g , Schlenz v. John Deere Co., 31 U.C.C.
(D.Mont. 1981) ; Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,
Rep. 1020
548 P2d 279 (Alaska 1976), 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1.
.

226 See, Ch.II) B) b)

2)

supra.

22_7

Majors v. Kalo Laborarories, Inc., 407
See, e.g
F.Supp. 20 (MD Ala. 1975), 18 U.C.C. Rep. 592; Johson v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F.Supp. 264 (ED Mich. 1976), 20
U.C.C. Rep. 163.
.

,

22S See, e.g , Phillips Petroleum Co., Norway v.
Bucyrus-Eric Co., 131 Wise. 2d 21, 1 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 2d 667
(1986); RRX Indus., Inc. v. Labcon, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 41
U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 1561 (9th Cir.1985).
.
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222)

In consumers transactions

There is little doubt that consequential damages

limitations with respect to consumers sales are viewed with

skepticism by both the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act and the
U.C.C. itself and thus unconscionability is likely to come

into play.

Under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act, a full

warranty may not exclude or limit consequential damages
unless the language conspicuously appears on the face of
the warranty. 229
As to the

U.C.C,

S.

2-719(3) makes clear that where

consumers are personally injured as a result of a defective
product, they should have no difficulty persuading the

court that the consequential damages exclusion was

unconscionable. 230

The same result is also likely to be

reached where consequential damages consisted of property

damage 231 even though, unlike injury to the person cases,

limitation is not here prima facie unconscionable.

Even

when the loss is economic but the goods are consumer goods,
courts will generally be more receptive to the consumer who

229 15 USC S. 2304(a) (3)
23 °See,

Tuttle v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co.,
e.g
585 P. 2d 1116 (Okla. 1978); Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64
N.J. 260, 315 A. 2d 16 (1974).
.

231 See, e.g , Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div.
320, 416 A. 2d 394 (1980).
.

N.J.

,

,

83
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seeks to recover damages than to the non-consumer who seeks
the same. 232

The Case Law Construction of the Civil Code's Regime

b)

of Damages

The starting point of the further discussion is

contained in Civ. C. Art. 1645. 233
disclaimers'

Exactly like warranty

issues, the Civ.C. sets up a distinction

between the good and bad faith seller.
is supposed to know of the goods'

Only the latter who

defects will be held

liable for "all damages incurred by the buyer."

The French

case law with the same strength and constancy as showed in

warranty disclaimers' cases 234 has irrebutably equated the
professional seller with the bad faith seller

(1)

and

rendered him responsible for all damages sustained by the

aggrieved buyer (2).
1

)

Presumption of professional seller's bad faith
The bad faith seller is the one who, prior to the

sale, knew of the defects or on account of his profession
232 See, e.g , McCarthy v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 28
Md.App. 421, 347 A. 2d 253 (1975); Schroeder v. Fageol
Motors Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P. 2d 20 (1975).
.

233 Art.l645 provides:
"If the seller knew of the defects in the thing, he is
liable not only for the price which he has received
therefor, but also for all damages incurred by the buyer."
234 For a general discussion,

supra.

See Ch.II) B) b)

2)
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should have known or could not be unaware of them. There is
no shortage of cases holding such a presumption: courts

have made no distinction between the members of the chain
of production and distribution. 235

Nor is there any

difference as to the nature of the goods involved. 235
The underlying rationale of such a presumption seems
to be contained in the professional seller's burden of

checking and knowing his products. 23

"

7

The bad faith

presumption is irrebutable: it is of no avail for the
seller to prove that the defect could not at all be

detected even by an expert seller. 233

However, the

professional seller may be exempted of his liability in
cases in which damage is primarily due to the buyer's
fault. 239

This is only application of the general

235 For an illustration concerning the manufacturer,
See, Comm. 07/171964, Bull. Civ. Ill , # 381.
For an exemple involving a wholesaler, See Comm.
12/17/1973, Bull. Civ. IV, # 367.
For a case dealing with a mere retailer, See Civ.
01/22/1974, D.1974, 288.
,

,

236 See, e.g. , Douai , 12/10/1963, Gaz.Pal. 1964.1.231.
(gas bottle); Comm. 07/17/1964, Bull. Civ. Ill
# 381.
(ship); Civ. 07/19/1965, D.1965, 389 (bread); Civ.
11/28/1966, D.1967, 99 (lemonade bottle); Civ. 03/27/1969,
D.1969, 633 (real estate); Civ. 07/16/1971, Gaz.Pal.
1971.2.810; Civ. 11/21/1972, J.C.P. 1974. 11.17890
,

(

automobile)
23V See,

e^.,

23S See, e.g

.

,

239 See, e.g

.

,

Comm.

04/27/1971, J.C.P. 1972.11.17280.

Comm. 11/08/1972, D.1973, Somm. 52;
11/27/1973, Bull. Civ. IV, # 344 & 345; Rouen,
02/22/1974, D.1974, Somm. 68.

Comm.

Comm.

02/17/1976, J.C.P. 1976.11.18482.
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contract liability principle pursuant to which the injury

sustained must be basically caused by the breach of the
contract, here the existence of hidden defects.

Extent of damages

2)

The seller's breach of warranty may compel him to pay

money damages to the aggrieved buyer himself as well as to
injured third parties. 240

The professional seller is

primarily held liable for all damages incurred by the
buyer.

The whole of the harm sustained will be compensated

whatever contractual remedy limitations might have been
stipulated.

One should here bear in mind the well settled

principle under which limiting-remedy clauses are treated
as if they had never existed. 24X

The aggrieved purchaser

is thus entitled not only to get back the purchase price

and the expenses directly connected to the sale but also be

compensated for inconvenience created 242 and lost
profits. 243

The duty of compensation which weighs on the

professional seller is extended to all damages suffered by
24 °For a general discussion on nonhorizontal privity
victims, See Ch.IV) B) b) infra.

24X For a general discussion on warranty limitations
under the French law, See Ch.III) A) a) 21) supra.
242 See, e g., Comm. 10/16/1972, D.1973,
JL
10/08/1973, Bull. Civ. IV, # 272.
243 See,

290; Comm.

e_;_g., Civ. 01/30/1967, J.C.P. 1967.11.15025;
Gaz.Pal. 1980. 1. Somm. 304.
10/18/1979,
Lyon,
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third parties because of the product's defects. This

liability is due by the manufacturer 244 and the retailer
as well, 24S the latter being able thereafter to sue the

former to get compensated. 245

Third party victims have a

direct cause of action against the professional seller. 24 7
"

244 See, e^g_., Civ.

11/15/1972, Bull. Civ. I,

245 See, e.g.. Civ.

06/22/1971, D.1971, Somm. 191.

246 See, e^g., Civ.

11/12/1961, Bull. Civ. I,

247 See, e.g.. Civ.

ft

#

246.

595.

11/15/1972, Bull. Civ. I, # 246;
12/05/1972, D.1973, 401.
For a general discussion on warranty beneficiaries
issues, See Ch.IV) infra.

Civ.

CHAPTER IV.

BENEFICIARIES OF WARRANTY OF QUALITY

In today's business practice, a product frequently is

distibuted from the manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser
through a panel of middlemen such as wholesalers, retailers
and dealers.

In that context and in addition to his rights

against his own seller, the miestion as to whether a

product's final user has

a

cause of action against a remote

seller or the manufacturer may arise if the product turns
out to be defective.

A breach of warranty action is based

on the notion of contract.

Thus, where no contractual

relationships exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant, as between the ultimate buyer and the manufacturer, the latter will try to escape from his liability

by raising lack of privity 248 as a defense.

Whenever the

buyer and the seller occupy adjacent links in the chain of

distribution, they are deemed to be in vertical privity

with each other.

To what extent may the party being sued,

as the manufacturer in the above example,

successfully

248 Privity of contract is that connection or
relationship which exists between two or more contracting
parties. It is essential to the maintenance of an action on

any contract that there should subsist a privity between
the plaintiff and defendant in respect of the matter sued
on (Black's law dictionary 1362, 4th ed. 1968).
106
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allege lack of vertical privity as a defense to a warrantyaction? (A)

Apart from the actual purchaser himself, there are
some other persons closely surrounding him, as the buyer's

family in case of consumer goods or the purchaser's

employees in commmercial transactions, who are likely to
get injured by defective goods.

These persons are obviously not within the chain of

distribution of the goods but nevertheless affected by the
goods' imperfection.

Whenever the party who seeks to get

damages for breach of warranty is outside of the chain of
distribution, he is not in horizontal privity with the

manufacturer or distributor of the goods.

In spite of lack

of horizontal privity, can a manufacturer or any of the

sellers be held liable for

b.

each of warranty vis-a-vis

such "alien" to the contractual arrangments?
A)

(B)

The Vertical Privity Issue

The issue that underlies our discussion is whether the

buyer is allowed to extend the class of potential defen-

dants to his action for breach of warranty beyond the

party who last sold the goods to him.

Starting from a very

strict vertical privity reguirement 249 the present American
249 See, e.g Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402
(Exch. 1842), Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120
F.865 (8th Circ. 1903); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash.
622, 135 P. 633 (1913); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash.
aff'd on rehearing, 168 Wash. 465, 15
456, 12 P. 2d 409,
P. 2d 1118 (1932)
.
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case law tendency is rather towards the elimination of the

vertical privity defense (a).

In contrast, the French case

law has always been clear as to the existence of a direct

cause of action of a sub-purchaser against a remote seller
or the manufacturer 250

a)

(b)

Under the American Law

:

A trend in favor of vertical

privity's abolishment.
The absence of vertical privity and its consequences

may be differently approached whether we deal with a breach
of express (1) or implied warranty (2).

1

)

In the context of express warranty

The contemplated hypothetical situation is where a

manufacturer issues
a

a

written express warranty, is sued by

retail purchaser for breach of express warranty and

raises the vertical privity defense.

The issue is then

whether privity of contract is essential to allow an action
against a manufacturer for breach of warranty. Both common
sense and legal arguments strongly are in favor of discarding the privity requirement.

There is little doubt that the warranty which

effec-

tively induces the purchase is given by the manufacturer
through mass advertising and labeling to ultimate business
users or consumers with whom he has no direct contractual
relationship.

Under these circumstances, it is highly

°See, e.g.

,

Civ.

01/12/1884, D.P. 85

.

1

.

357
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unrealistic to limit purchasers protection to warranties
'

made directly to him by his immediate seller.

The

protection he really needs is against the manufacturer
whose published representations caused him to make the

purchase
Official Comment

2

to S.2-313 25:L underscores how

little sense it would make to retain the vertical privity

defense when an express warranty is intended for no member
of the chain of distribution but the ultimate buyer and

actual user. There is no shortage of cases sustaining that

point of view. 252

In the context of consumer goods it is

noteworthy that the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act 253 sets
forth a direct cause of action for the aggrieved buyer

against the manufacturer.

Vertical privity as an available defense for breach of
implied warranty is definitely of a greater effectiveness.

251 Official Comment 2, S. 2-313 states: "Although this
section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to
warranties made by the seller to the buyer as part of a
contract for sale, the warranty sections of this Article
are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case

law growth which have recognized that warranties need not
be confined either to sales contracts or to the direct
parties to such a contract."
252 See, e.g , Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 567 P. 2d
916 (Mont. 1977), 22 U.C.C.Rep. 375; Ferguson v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 524 F.Supp. 1042 (D.Conn. 1981), 33 U.C.C.Rep
548; R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 531 F.Supp.
201 (ND 111.1981), 33 U.C.C.Rep. 532.
.

253 15 USC S.

2310 (d) (1976)
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In the context of implied warranty

2)

The provisions enshrined in the U.C.C. do not address
the vertical privity issue, and also as suggested in

Official Comment

3,

S.2-318 254

,

the Code is "neutral" with

respect thereto.
The courts have therefore felt free to shape their own

vertical privity rules. 255

Only the implied warranty of

merchantability 256 will be discussed further.

Indeed the

implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 25 7 is
"

only conceivable between the purchaser and his immediate
seller.

We should here recall that the concept of warranty

of fitness for purpose does not embrace inherently defec-

tive goods but rather special use intended by the buyer and

communicated to the seller whose expertise is relied
upon. 258
254 Official Comment 3, S.2-318 provides in part:
the section is neutral and is not intended to
enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells,
extends to other persons in the distributive chain."
"

.

.

.

255 See, e.g ., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.
2d 279, 287-88 (Alaska 1976); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc
v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2D 77, 81 (Tex. 1977); Spring Motors
Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motors Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489
A. 2d 660, 676 (1985)
256 S.

2-314.

25_7

2- 315.

S.

258 See for a general discussion, Chap. I) A) a)

2)

supra
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Whenever lack of vertical privity is raised against a
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, the key
issue will be:

what kind of injury is suffered by the

aggrieved plaintiff?

have to be separately treated from economic losses

(21)
(22)

21)

Personal injury and property loss

.

In case of personal injury and property loss
As a matter of well settled result, the lack of

vertical privity will not be a bar to recovery for personal
injury.

Only the legal tool supporting such an outcome has

changed over the last few decades. Initially, as the famous

decision in Henningsen

v.

Bloomfied Motors, Inc. 259 bore

witness, the removal of vertical privity as a defense

rested upon the implied warranty of merchantability theory.

Indeed the New Jersey Supreme Court abolished the vertical

privity requirement in a case dealing with a defective
automobile which caused personal injury by stating:

"...

we hold that under modern marketing conditions, when a

manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream of trade
and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied

warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such
accompanies it into the hands of ultimate purchaser."
The implied warranty theory in cases involving

personal injuries has now been superseded in most

259 32 N.J.

358,

161 A. 2d 69

(1960).
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jurisdictions by a strict tort liability theory whose
ground is to be found in

S.

402 A of the Restatement 2nd of

Torts. 260 The same approach has been followed by the

courts for property loss which is clearly in the picture of
S.

402 A of the Restatement 2nd of Torts. 251

Thus most

courts will first examine the plaintiff's losses and then

classify them as personal injury or property damage which
are recoverable under S.

402 A. 262

In contrast, economic damage is primarily recoverable

under contract theory and therefore subject to the U.C.C.

provisions

2SO RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S. 402 A.
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical
Harm to User or Consumer:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his

property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
2s:L

See, e.g ., Rossingnoi v. Danbury School of
Aeronautics, Inc., 227 A2d 418 (Conn. 1967), 4 UCC Rep.
305; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 NE2d 182 (111. 1965),
2 UCC Rep. 7 62.
2S2 See, e.g , Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler
Corp., 49 111. App.3d 194, 364 N e 2D 100 (1977) ("The
line of demarcation between physical harm and economic loss
in our view reflects the line of demarcation between tort
.

.

theory and contract theory.")-

.

.
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In case of economic loss

)

Should lack of vertical privity bar compensation for

economic losses? An answer to such a question would lead us
to address two issues,

namely:

(i)

on what basis (221)?

and (ii) to what extent (222)?
221

)

On what basis
In Santor v. A

&

M Karagheusian, Inc., 2S3 the New

Jersey Supreme Court not only disregarded the absence of

privity of contract but also stated that the manufacturer
of products, here carpets,

is strictly liable in torts to

ultimate consumer for injuries resulting from defective
products even where only damage to articles sold or to
other property of consumer is involved.
If vertical privity may be discarded when the buyer

has suffered purely economic loss, it is clear that it will
not be any longer strict torts rules but Article
U.C.C. which should govern economic loss. 264

2

of the

In a recent

decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court itself rejected the

2e3 44 N.J.

52,

207 A. 2d 305

(1965).

S4 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
17 (1965). In that case it was held
P. 2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr
the history of the doctrine of strict
that:
-

.

"...

liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to
undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or the
Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct
problem of physical injuries."
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application of strict liability to the commercial
context. 25S
222)

To what extent

There is actually a split of authority between

jurisdictions which have retained the vertical privity
requirement 255 and jurisdictions which have abolished the

vertical privity bar in cases concerning economic loss
incurred by consumer 25 7 as well as by commercial pur"

chasers. 258

In jurisdictions where lack of privity has

been abrogated as a defense to a breach of warranty
action, there are still some interesting issues to be

debated:

What about the effectiveness of a remote seller's

disclaimer or limitation of warranty against the palintiff
with whom he had no contractual links? What about the

255 Spring Motors Distributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
98 N.J. 555, 489 A. 2d 660(1985).
255 See , e.g , Candlelight Homes, Inc. v. Zornes, 414
N.E. 2d 980, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Professional Lens
Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 234 Kan. 742, 755, 675
P. 2d 887, 898-99 (1984)
.

257 See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548
P. 2d 279, (Alaska 1976); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Shivers,
557 S.W. 2d 77 (Tex. 1977).

25B See

Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,
403 P. 2d 145, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17 (1965); Acadina Health
Club, Inc. v. Hebert, 469 So. 2d 1186 (La. Ct. App. 1985);
Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555 A.
,

2d 660 (1985)

e.g

.

.

,
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notice of breach requirement under

S. 2-607

(

3

)

(

a)

2S9

It

seems logical to enforce the initial provisions of the

contract, such as a warranty disclaimer, in the same way as

they would have operated had the parties been in privity.
Indeed, the ultimate purchaser who seeks to claim his

rights flowing from a breach of warranty can not be held to

have greater rights than the one from whom he purchased the
The enforceability of the remote seller's contract

goods.

defenses in the nonprivity context will protect him from an

unlimited liability and therefore be consistent

with the

denying of the recovery of economic loss under strict
liability in tort.
b)

2 70
"

Under the French law

:

The vertical privity defense

disregarded
As a matter of principle, the purchaser's cause of

action is primarily against his own seller because they are
in privity of contract. Since most products nowadays are

channelled through a long chain of distribution, each
2e9 See our discussion on that issue, Ch.II) A)
supra.

a)

23)

27 °/ See for a general

discussion on the extension of
warranty disclaimers and limitations in a nonprivity
context:
* Enforcing manufacturers' warranty exclusions against nonprivity commercial purchasers, 20 Georgia L.Rev. 461

(1986)

.

Enforcing the rights of the remote seller under the
warranty disclaimers, the implied warranty of
U.C.C.:
merchantability and the notice requirement in the
nonprivity context, 47 Univ. of Pittsburgh L.Rev. 873 (1986)
*
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member of the chain has a cause of action against his own
seller in case of an unsafe product.

That is why in order

to avoid waste of time inherent to endless litigations and
to better protect the ultimate purchaser's rights,

the

French case law has already a century ago 271 abolished the

vertical privity requirement and ever since stuck to that

position (1).

Only the rationale underlying such a case

law has been debated over the last decades to finally come
to be recently settled (2).
1

)

The vertical privity hurdle wiped out by a constant

case law

According to a well settled case law, the final
purchaser of a defective product has a cause of action
against his own seller as well as against any of the remote
2 72
"

sellers.

Initially the sub-purchaser suing the manufac-

turer could bring either a breach of warranty action or a
tort action based on the notion of negligence.

2 73
"

The

French Supreme Court in a decision rendered on
10/09/1979 274 held that the sub-purchaser's cause of
271 See, e.g.. Civ. 01/12/1884, D.P. 85

.

1

.

357

2V2 See, e.g.. Civ. 02/04/1963, S. 1963. 193, D.1963.
Somm.75; Civ., 01/05/1972, J. C. P. 1973 .II 17340;
Comm. 10/18/1982, Bull. Civ. Ill, # 318, 268.
.

273 See , e.g
274 Civ.

.

,

Comm.

06/26/1978, Bull. Civ. IV,

10/09/1979, Bull. Civ.,

#

241,

192,

Comm.
D. 1980. I .R. 222; Followed later, See , e.g
10/14/1981, G. P. 1982.1. Pan. 128; Comm. 11/04/1982,
Bull. Civ. IV,
335, 284.
.

ft

,

#

177,

150
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action against the manufacturer or any intermediate seller
in case of hidden defects of the product sold is neces-

sarily a breach cause of action and consequently had to be

brought within the short-time period of Art 1648
.

2_75
.

It

has to be underlined that the sub-purchaser may seek to
get the contract's rescission 2 75 as well as money
"

damages.

2

"

"

7 7

If on the one hand a direct cause of action

has always been available to the final purchaser against
the manufacturer or any remote seller, on the other hand

the rationale for such a right has been controversial.

2

)

The case law underlying rationale

Whenever

a

statute lays down a cause of action, there

is no need for an underlying rationale:
is sufficient justification.

the statute itself

In contrast, if a cause of

action is based upon judicial precedents, it is essential
to figure out which legal device may be invoked as an

explanation.

In case of several sales in a row the

aggrieved buyer, as indicated earlier, may choose to sue
any of the sellers; but there still remains the following

275 For a general discussion on the short-time period
to bring an action, See Chap. II) A) b) supra.

27s For a general discussion on remedies for breach of
warranty, See Chap. Ill) supra.
2 77
"

See, Comm. 05/17/1982, Bull. Civ. IV, # 182, 162, D.
1983. I. R. 479 (This decision overrules Comm. 02/27/1973,
D.1974. 138 which only allowed money damages recovery).
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How to explain his direct cause of action for

issue:

breach of warranty?
Three theories have been contemplated: two of them
have to be set aside (21); the remaining one has to be

retained
21

(

22

)

The rationales to set aside

)

Both transfer of debt (211) and third party

beneficiary (212) theories are unsatisfactory explanations.
211

)

The transfer of debt theory

According to Dean Rodiere every sale would include an
implied transfer of debt of the legal warranty action.

2 "78

This theory would rest upon Art.ll35 2V9 in the sense that
the breach of warranty action would be one of the

"consequences which equity, usage or the law imposes upon
the obligation according to its nature."

This theory has been rejected by courts 280 mainly

because under Art.1690 281 any transfer of debt is
278 See,

Dean Rodiere'

e^.,
s

Aix, 10/05/1954, J C. P. 1955 .II 8548 and
.

.

comments.

2_79

Agreements are binding not only
Art.ll35 provides:
as to what is expressed, but also as to all the consequences which equity, usage or the law imposes upon the
obligation according to its nature"
2BO See, e.g.

,

Civ., 03/23/1968, D. 1970. 663.

2S1 Art.l690 provides: "The assignee has title with
respect to third parties only upon service of notice upon

Nevertheless the assignee may also acquire
the debtor.
title by acceptance of the assignment made by the debtor by
authentic act"
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subjected to formalism which is in the related context
never complied with.

The third party beneficiary theory

212)

Under this rationale, any intermediary in the chain
of distribution of the product is supposed to stipulate

that the hidden defect warranty is due to him as well as to
any sub-purchaser. Thus any contract of sale would trigger
an implied warranty in favor of a third party beneficiary.

This explanation would find support in Art. 1122. 2B2

Such a

theory has to be discarded. Indeed it assumes the acceptance of the third party beneficiary.

The latter would

feel free to either accept the stipulation and consequently

bring an action or refuse and accordingly sue under a tort
basis.

This would clearly contradict the Supreme Court's

holding under which the purchaser's direct cause of action
is "necessarily a contract action". 283

22)

The rationale to establish

:

The theory of

transmission
The most accepted theory by the french doctrine 2B4
2B2 Art.ll22 provides: "A person is deemed to have
stipulated for himself and his heirs and assigns, unless
the contrary is expressed or followed from the nature of

the agreement"
2B3 See, Civ., 10/09/1979, Bull. Civ. I,

#

241,

192.

2B4 See Aubry & Rau, French Civil Law, 7th edition
(1975), # 414, 638-642; The Law of Redhibition in France
and Louisiana (1975), 49 Tul. L. Rev. 372-274.
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and case law 233 is that the legal warranty for redhibitory

defects is transmitted as an accessory of the object of
sale from the manufacturer to the ultimate purchaser.
Art. 1615 states that "the obligation of deliver a thing

includes its accessories and all things associated with its

permanent use"

.

The transmission of the warranty action to

every purchaser would merely be an application of the above

mentioned article.

The Supreme Court which met in "full

assembly" seemed to have expressly adopted such a theory.

Indeed in its decision of 02/07/1986 286 it held that "the

sub-purchaser takes advantage of all the rights of his

predecessor in title and conseguently has

a

direct contract

cause of action for breach of warranty against the

manufacturer"
B)

The Horizontal Privity Issue

Any plaintiff who is not the actual purchaser of

a

product but is affected by its imperfections is a

horizontal nonprivity plaintiff. Will such an aggrieved
plaintiff have a cause of action against the one who

Assuming a

manufactured or sold the defective products?

cause of action, what will be then the legal theory

sustaining his claim?

These important issues have been

285 See,
S. 1886.

e^., Civ. 11/12/1884, D.P. 1885 1 357
1.149 Comm. 02/03/1976, Bull. Civ. IV, # 42, 36.
.

.

,

2B6 See, Ass. Plen. 02/07/1986, D. 1986, 293; J.C.P
1986.11.20616; G.P. 1986 2 543 R.T.D. Civ. 1986 364, 605
.

.

;

,
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approached quite differently under the American and French
law. The former specifically addresses the issue through a

contract theory perspective whereas the latter is

definitely "tort oriented". While the current American
standpoint lacks uniformity and consequently certainty as
to the protection assured to third party victims of a

defective product (a), the French law guarantees security
to horizontal nonprivity victims (b)
a)

Under the American law

:

The U.C.C. S.2-318 28

"

7

and its uncertainties
28 7 S. 2-318,
'

Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied, provides:

Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable
to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
[29 states have adopted Alternative A]
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
[6 states and the Virgin Islands have adopted Alternative
B]

Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends
to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by
breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section with respect to injury to the
person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
[6 states have adopted Alternative C]
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The U.C.C. drafters by adopting S. 2-318 laid down a

horizontal antiprivity provision. Indeed they entitled it:
"Third party beneficiaries of warranties express or
implied". It has been unfortunately impossible to reach a

unique version of what is commonly presented as an

abolition of the horizontal privity defense.

S.

2-318 splits

into three alternatives and thus gives birth to some

differences from one state to another. This lack of

uniformity amounts to some uncertainties as to the
protection offered to third party victims of a breach of
warranty and renders necessary to discuss to whom the

warranty is due

(1)

and which kind of injuries are covered

(2).

1

)

As to whom the warranty is due

Alternative A is undisputably the least "openoriented" alternative as to the class of third party

victims who may have a cause of action for breach of
warranty. Indeed Alternative A restricts potential

beneficiaries to "any natural person who is in the family
or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home"

Judicial precedents have not surprisingly deemed the
buyer's children, 2BB grandchildren 289 and nieces 290 to be
2SB See , e.g , Chaff in v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling
194 S.E.2d 679 (Ga. Ct App. 1972), 11 U.C.C. Rep. 737
.

Co.,

.

2B9 See, e.g
(Ga. Ct. App.
.

679

,

Chastain v. Fuqua Indus., 275 S.E.2d
31 U.C.C. Rep. 79.

1980),

included within the privileged circle of protected victims
under Alternative

A.

The courts construction of this
'

category of plaintiffs entitled to sue under Alternative A
is, however,

narrow, since a guest in automobile is not a

"guest in the purchaser's home". 291

patron of

a

Neither a guest of a

restaurant 292 nor a football player using a

helmet supplied by a school 293 were considered under

Alternative A to be the buyer's guests to whom the seller's

warranty had to be extended.

Alternative A is thus

construed by courts to be strictly confined to enumerated
third party beneficiaries. That is why the argument under

which purchaser's employees may be encompassed among the
buyer's "industrial family" has been

rejected by most of

the courts in states ruled by Alternative A. 294

In contrast, Alternative B and C enlarge the pool of

potential plaintiffs. Alternative B discards the
requirement that the natural person be either a member of
29 °See,

e^., Wolfe

Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143
(Mass. App. Ct. 1978), 24 U.C.C.Rep. 79.
v.

291 See , e.g
Marcus v. Spada Bros. Auto Serv.,
U.C.C.Rep. 390 (Pa. Ct CP 1967).
.

,

4

.

292 See, e.g , Calanek v. Howard Johson,
U.C.C.Rep. 658 (Mass. App. Dec. 1962).
.

293 See, e.g
Hemphill v. Sayers,
U.C.C.Rep. 758 S.D. 111. 1982)
.

,

Inc.,

552 F.Supp.

4

685,

(

294 See, e.g
Bailey v. ITT Grinnel Corp., 536
F.Supp. 84 (N.D.Ohio 1982); In re Johns-Mansvillle
Asbestosis Cases, 511 F.Supp. 1235, 31 U.C.C.Rep. 478
(N.D.1981); Watkins v. Barber-Colman Co., 29 U.C.C.Rep.
1271 (5th 1980)
.

,

35
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the buyer's family or household or a guest in his home.

Accordingly a mere bystander may invoke the privilege of
Alternative B.

Alternative C eliminates the distinction

between natural and non-natural and thus widens a bit more
the scope of the seller's warranty responsibility.

Lastly, under each of the Alternatives, whoever may be

deemed third party beneficiary, he must "reasonably be
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods".

2

)

As to which kind of injuries is covered

The key question is whether personal injury or

economic loss has been suffered by the plaintiff. Under

Alternative A and B, the sole personal injuries are

expressly aimed at. On the contary, Alternative

C

merely

refers to a person "who is injured by breach of the

warranty" and therefore leads to believe that third party

beneficiaries may recover property damage and economic loss
as well.

However, Official Comment

3

of S.2-318 295 has

cast a doubt on such an interpretation.

Eminent authori-

ties like Professors White and Summers 296 construe the

foregoing Official Comment as limiting Alternative C's
295 0fficial Comment 3, S.2-318 states in part: "The
third alternative goes further, following the trend of
modern decisions as indicated by Restatement 2nd of Torts,
S.402 A, in extending the rule beyond injuries to the

person"
296 See, J.White & R.Summers, Handbook of the Law under
the U.C.C. (2nd ed. 1980), S.ll-5, 407.
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scope of application to personal injury and property damage
and not to economic loss. They draw from the reference to

S.402 A the drafters intent to only apply Alternative C to
'

personal injury and property loss cases.
Arguments supporting the opposite approach may be
egually sustained: first, Alternative C construed as
economic loss not recoverable would not really be different
from Alternative B; second, the Alternative C on its face
is not restricted to any particular kind of harm.

It seems that Professors White and Summers's opinion

has found a favorable echo in the view of courts. The

Supreme Court of Iowa among others held that

S. 2-318,

Alternative C did not extend its warranty protection to
third party beneficiaries who have only suffered economic
loss; the term "injured" has been interpreted to include

only physical harm to the plaintiff or his property
b)

Under the French law

:

23_7

An increasing protection for

third party victims of a defective product

The one who is injured is not, under the French law,
free to choose between a contract and tort action. If he is
a

contracting party or even a vertical privity victim, only

a

contract action will be available to him. 29S
29_7

If he is a

Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 38 U.C.C.Rep. 1177 (Iowa 1984).
29B See,

supra Chap. IV) A) b)
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third party victim, a tort action is mandatory. Thus the

nonhorizontal privity plaintiffs, that is those who use the
goods without having purchased them, will definitely be

considered as third party victims whose cause of action
must be a tort action.

Hence Civ.C. Art. 1382 and 1383 299 will come into play
and the seller's negligence will have to be proven. 300

The

French case law through its application of Art. 1382 and
1383 has ensured

satisfactory protection to third party

victims of defective products (1). A recent EEC council

Directive of 07/25/1985 on product liability, which is
consumer protection oriented, will in a near future provide
a separate cause of action against manufacturers for

defective products (2).

299 Art.

"Every act of a man which
1382 provides:
causes injury to another obligates the one by whose fault
Art. 1383 provides: "Everyone
it occured to give redress".
is responsible for the injury he has caused not only by his
act, but also by his negligence or imprudence".
3

°°We have to also to add that some decisions retained
the seller's responsability on the basis of Art. 1384(1)
"A person is responsible not only for the
which provides:
injury which he causes by his own act, but also for that
which is caused by the act of persons for whom he is
responsible, or things which he has in his care." These
decisions enlarged the notion of "things which one has in
his care" by deeming the seller still responsible for the
Civ.,
internal structure of the thing sold. See e.g
02/02/1982, D.1982, I.R.330 (explosion of a water-heater);
This case law seems to
Civ. 11/15/1972, Bull. Civ. I, # 246.
find better justification when the manufacturer rather than
any other seller is held liable under Art. 1384(1).
,

.

,
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The case law application of Art. 1382

"H

&

1383

As a matter of principle a third party victim of a

defective product who brings an action under Art 1382/1383
.

has to show seller's negligence. Negligence consists in

letting imperfect goods go into the stream of the market.
The proof of such a fault has been made easier by the case
law.

However, since recently, a distinction is to be drawn

from whether the manufacturer (11) or a mere retailer (12)
is sued.
11

)

The manufacturer's liability is presumed

Under Art 1382/1383
.

,

the aggrieved third party victim

should demonstrate the manufacturer's negligence that is a

design defect or manufacturing flaw which amounted to an

hidden defect.

If the product's defectiveness is quite

easy to ascertain, the fault which gave rise to such a

defect is rather difficult to be proven. That is why the
case law has decided that the manufacturer is presumed to

know of his products imperfections and consequently has to
'

be held liable to distibute such product into the market.

The mere evidence of a hidden defect will be sufficient to

imply the manufacturer's negligence

30:L
.

Thus whether the victim is a contracting party or a

third party the case law has ensured a similar protection

301 See, e^_g., Civ, 12/05/1964, Bull. Civ. I, # 234,
181; Civ., 07/18/1972, Bull. Civ. I, # 189, 164, D.1973,
S.39; Civ., 12/05/1972, D.1973. 401; Comm. 06/26/1978,
Bull. Civ. IV, # 177, 150.
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by holding the manufacturer liable in commercializing

inherently defective products. The mere retailer's

situation is to that respect somewhat different.
12)

The retailer's liability is to be proven

Until a recent Supreme Court's decision of

04/26/1983 302

,

it was well settled that the mere retailer

had to be equated with the manufacturer as to his liability
towards third party victims whenever he delivered defective
products. The situation was as like as the legal warranty
due in the same conditions by the manufacturers and the

mere suppliers to their purchaser. 303

From now on, there is a difference between contract
and tort liability due by manufacturers and retailers: the

latter are not any longer presumed liable vis-a-vis third

party victims simply because he sold a defective product.
The mere supplier will only be held liable if he knew of
the defect or was negligent in checking the product's

quality before delivery.
We may imply from the 1983 Supreme Court's decision
the intent to primarily channel products liability towards
the manufacturer.

This is also the aim pursued by the EEC Directive of

07/25/1985 on products liability.

302 Civ.,
3°3

04/26/1983 Bull. Civ. Ill

See, Ch.IV) A) b)

supra.

,

#

90,

71
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The EEC Directive of 07/25/1985

3°4

on products

liability
The EEC Council recently enacted a new consumer

protected piece of legislation. Indeed, the 07/25/1985 EEC
Council Directive, application of which in each Member
State should have become reality by 08/30/1988

3°5

sets up

as a thrust that the manufacturer liability for defective
'

products has to be a strict liability. The Directive makes
no distinction as to whether the victim of a defective

product is a third party or the purchaser himself.

There-

fore a new cause of action will be available to victims of

defective products in addition to their already existing
contract and tort actions.

The implementation of such a

Directive requires us to explain the manufacturer's

definition (21), the defect's notion (22) and the class of
recoverable injuries (23).

3°4

Council Directive of 07/25/1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and provisions of the
Member States concerning liability for defective products,
85/374/EEC, L2/ # 210/ 29.
3QS EEC Directive Art. 19 provides: "Member States
shall bring into force, not later than three years from the
date of notification of this Directive, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply
with this Directive. They shall forthwith inform the

Commission thereof.
Comments
* This Directive was notified to the Member States on
07/30/1988.
* As of 04/02/1989 France had not enacted any statute to
comply with the EEC Council Directive.
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The definition of manufacturer
As contemplated by the EEC Directive, 30S the manu-

facturer encompasses the one who makes the finished

product as well as the raw materials and component parts.
Anyone who holds himself out as a manufacturer by commer-

cializing products under his own trademark is also aimed
at.

Moreover importers and suppliers, if they do not

disclose the manufacturer or importer's identity, will be
equated with the producer for the Directive's application
purposes. 30

"

7

The definition of the manufacturer is thus

particularly wide and virtually guarantees victims to find
always someone liable for the defects of products. The

effectiveness of such

a

protection is reinforced by the

manufacturer's inability to disclaim his liability. 308
22)

The notion of defect

Under Art.l, "the producer shall be liable for damage

caused by a defect in his product"

.

The Directive goes on

and specifies that "a product is defective when it does not

provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect". 309

The Directive definitely stresses the lack of

security that may flow from a defective product rather than
306 See, Art. 3.
3°7
3°8

See, Art.

3

(3)

See, Art. 12.

309 See, Art. 6.

.
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on its unfitness for performance. The security assured by

the product has to be assessed in the context of a

reasonable use. 310
23)

The class of recoverable injuries

Personal injuries and property losses will be
recoverable. 311
As to the latter we have to underline that the

Directive does not supply any warranty for the defective
product itself but only pertains to damage caused by the

defective product. In addition two limits are set up:
first, property losses must concern consumer goods.

Accordingly, damaged property has to be normally used by
the victim for his private needs. 312

Second there is a 500

ECU deductible from the damages awarded in order to avoid

endless litigations. 313

The emotional distress compensa-

tion is not specifically dealt with in the Directive and
remains under national sovereign regulations. 314

31 ° See

,

Art. 6, 1, b.

311 See, Art. 9.
312 See, Art. 6, b,

(i)

313 See, Art. 6, b.

314 See, Art.

9

in fine.

&

(ii)

CONCLUSION
Our final comments will split into two categories: we

will contemplate, on the one hand, the legal approach

followed by the American and French system with respect to
the problems raised and, on the other hand, the practical

consequences which have resulted from them.
As far as the legal approach is concerned, we

started this study fully convinced that common and law
civil systems were to be opposed: the former highly case
law oriented, the latter deeply statutory regulated. With

respect to warranty issues we have to seriously qualify
such an appraisal.
Indeed, we have noticed that the French law as

regards the hidden defect
judicial precedents.

warranty is primarily based on

The few related Civil Code Articles

have been sometimes audaciously construed by courts. It may
have even happened that the Civil Code drafters' intent has

been superseded by courts' interpretation. It is not an

overstatement to contend that the hidden defect warranty
concept has been, on the Code's basis though, mostly

defined by the case law. Likewise, and as to warranty
disclaimers, available remedies in case of breach of

warranty and warranty beneficiaries, the French law
132
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solutions are either entirely judicial precedents founded
or with no resemblance at all to the Code provisions.

In contrast we have seen how detailed the Uniform

Commercial Code warranty provisions are and how little room
has been permitted to courts to shape their policy. The
area of warranty of quality is highly regulated under the

American law. Not only the Uniform

Commercial Code

provisions are heavily relied upon but also the Code
Official Comments are constantly referred to. To a certain
extent these Official Comments seem to be actual pieces of

legislation which courts should not depart from.
As far as the practical result achieved by our study

is concerned, we can not reasonably state that either legal

system better protects the disappointed buyer's interests.
We may merely notice that the extent of the warranty of

quality is certainly wider under the American law. Indeed,
a breach of implied warranty of merchantability is easier

to show than to meet the required conditions to trigger the

legal hidden defects warranty. But, at the same time, the

foregoing comment has to be counterbalanced by the seller's

ability to disclaim his warranty obligations under the
U.C.C., which is virtually impossible under the French law.

The most common feature brought up is certainly the

increasing protection assured to consumers. Both countries
have enacted a specific body of rules to enhance consumers'
protection. Even courts are inclined to rule in favor of

134

aggrieved consumers. As to commercial transactions,

warranty of quality issues shoud be typically governed by
the freedom of contract principle. This desire seems to

find a better support under the American law.

These final considerations lead one to wonder whether

differences between civil and common law systems are as
great as they are thought to be. With respect to the

undertaken study the answer is probably negative.
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